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PHEFACK
The purpose of this tbeais 1» to examine the major 
teat of collective security that eaise up In the League of 
Nation»# Prior to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict* the League 
had oscillated between eucce»» and faulure* but in 1935 the 
member» realized that the continued deterioration of the 
international situation required the League to take a stand* 
If it should prove incapable of dealing with this crisis* 
then the principles of the Covenant would be swept away 
by political opportun!4jiu. Ihe desire that the League should 
succeed was for the most part a genuine one* but the desire 
to avert a war and the desire to avert wars are not neo** 
esswily the same* And that difference was significant in 
the League»® failure to halt Italy# The machlnatione of 
European politics overwhelmed the Covenant* and onoe again 
the idealists fell before the politicians*
Deservingly or not* the League received a bad name 
for this failure# In an age when the United ^>tlons has 
inherited the task of maintaining the peace* the lessons 
gained from the Italo-Kthiopian conflict retr,in their 
validity#
In studying the aotluus of the League of Natioiis* 
one thing stands out# International organizations* as they
11
Ill
have axl&ted, rely as much on a common will to maintain 
themselves as they do on thslr constituted authority* If 
the League failed where the United Nations has not, it was 
because of the lack of this will in the former, and not be­
cause the latter is a better constituted organisation#
Given the same conditions under which the League operated, 
there le little evidence that the United Uatlone would en«* 
joy any more success than its predecessor* In comparing 
the League of îîatlcna with the United Kations, one signi­
ficant difference is the degree of a will to succeed a»iong 
their respective memberships. This was the only innovation 
In the United Nations actions in Korea, but it was enough 
to halt an act of aggression*
This thesis then will recount the history of the 
Italo-Ethiopian conflict as It concerned the League of 
Illations# and from this certain conclusions will be drawn, 
Since It is not the intention to recall the history of the 
entire dispute, but only the actions taken by the League 
to reach a settlement# many of the outside political con­
siderations will not be discussed* When these had a pro­
found influence on the actions of the Letigue# they will be 
mentioned# but the inadequacy of sources precluded all but 
a minimum of interpretation.
The main sources of information consisted of the
iv
various official publications of the League of Nations* 
auch as the Official Journal and the various supplementa 
to It, Documenta on International Affairs, published 
by the Royal Institute of International Affaira# has been 
a helpful source for material not Included In the League 
of Nations publications# but because this thesis deals 
primarily with the League# the great bulk of the infor­
mation comes from the League records#
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OHAJPTEH I 
GSIJKRAL COnSIDEI^ATICKS
The Position the League of Nrtions# This study 
will deal with the manner and degree in whiob the princi­
ple of collective security was followed out and utilised 
by the League in the italo-Ethiopian Conflict* Although 
this was not the first threat to the peace that confronted 
the League of Nations^ it was the first instance In which 
an attempt was made to implement the use of sanctions af­
ter declaring r. member of the organization to be an aggres­
sor.
The League was standing on rather shaky foundations 
before this dispute had arisen, and, at events later shoved, 
this particular incident was largely responsible for even 
more serious shocks and tremors that contributed to Its 
eventual collapse. As originally envisioned by its found­
ers, all of the leading powers of the world were expected 
to be members, but by 1935 many of Its chairs ware vacant. 
The United States had never accepted the principles of the 
Covenant, and others lÆkO had once subscribed to them were 
now absent, Germany and Japan had withdrawn, and growing 
doubts and a lack of faith were causing others to consider
the same step* More than anything else, this vas because 
the League had proved Itself to be Incapable of dealing 
effectively with those larger powers who had In one way or 
another contested the League<s prerogatives# This caused 
a valid concern among many of the small powers and did much 
to destroy their faith in It*
In 1920 it had been unable to check foland^s seizure 
of Vilna; in 1923 It had not halted the Italian occupation 
of Corfu; and even more damning was its failure to take a 
stand in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria In 1931 and 
the Korth China province of Jehol two years later#
This time the League would be dealing with Italy* 
a state that* very recently at least* had been exercising 
considerable force within Its chambers# It is little 
wonder that the members were hesitant to grapple with the 
dispute and risk another failure* They realised* however* 
that the survival of the Covenant depended on success In 
treating with the aggressor* It was undoubtedly felt that 
there might not be another chance should there be failure* 
Pew would have the necessary faith to trust the League to 
maintain the peace another time#
The Position of Italy# Fascist Italy was well aware 
of this concern* but seemed to feel from past events that 
she would not be unduly hindered by the League* Italy,
by courtesy if not In fact* was a great power within the 
organisation^ Thia^ oombined with the realisation th^t 
the League waa more interested in European affairs than 
in a backward country In Africa, prompted Mussolini to 
take the gamble*
Why did Mussolini feel it necessary to extend 
Italian suzerainty over Ethiopia? It waa probably a com-» 
blnatlon of factors— psychological# économie# and political** 
These are the usual motives for expansion, and Italy on this 
occasion felt that these justified her aggression*
The population of Italy was dense# and the expedient 
method of alleviating this problem seemed to lie in colo* 
nialism* By this measure# the talents of the immigrants 
would not be lost to the mother country* Italy's economic 
structure was unstable at the time# partly because of world 
economic conditions# and the transporting of a segment of 
the population seemed a wise solution* Secondly# if the 
colonial area should at the same time be a depository of 
varied resources, an added benefit would acrmie*
Thirdly, with this same type of rationalization# 
Italy saw an added advantage in an acquisitive policy* <)he
^Arnold J# Toynbee# Survey of International Affairs# 
Abyssinia and Italy# 1935# Vol. II# (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press# 1.936)# p* 12#
felt additional territory would enhance her International 
at&ndlng^ and she «till harbored an imredresaed grievance 
over her small share In the spoil» of World War I* Italy 
had heén given to believe# by Great Britain and France^ 
that at the successful conclusion of the war she would be 
awarded extensive territories In Africa. All Italy had been 
able to extract# however# were minor boundary adjustments# 
which had left a definite feeling of resentment over this 
unfulfilled pledge# But under the leadership of Mussolini# 
Italy seemed bn the verge of correcting what was considered 
a great injustice*
Lastly# there were two predominant psychological 
motives* It was felt that what Italy would be doing in 
the twentieth century would not be greatly different from 
what Great Britain and France had done in the prooodirg 
century* Why should Ital> be chastised now for the same 
behavior recently exhibited by established imperialist pow*» 
era who had alreidy acquired overseas areas? While arguing 
that France as recently as 1931: had completed her control 
over Morocco# the Italians lost sight of the fact that the 
type of territorial gain they were contemplating was no 
longer pblitlcally acceptable#
The second psychological motive evolved from the 
past relations between Italy and Ethiopia# At the end of
the nlnateeifitli century» &t the time of the first military 
aggression Italy launched against Ethiopia» the latter had 
defeated an Italian contingent at Adowa# Mussolini onoe 
said that this ^wound to the Italian heart” must be healed 
once and for all.
Relations between Italy and Ethiopia» In the twen­
ties» Italy had tried a policy of friendship to achieve 
her ends» and» ironically» it had been largely duo to 
Italian support that Ethiopia had been admitted into the 
League of Nations* In a further attempt to obtain a fav­
ored position, Italy had signed a Treaty of Friendship, 
Conciliation» and Arbitration with Ethiopia in 1928# Pre-* 
liminary steps were worked out to improve trade between the 
two countries through the Italian colonies of Eritrea and 
Italian Somaliland» and Italy felt she would soon enjoy a 
favored economic position in Ethiopia, There were provi­
sions for road construction and Ethiopian use of a free 
zone in the Italian port of Aaab# But for some reason
Ethiopia did not choose to take advantage of these treaty
?provisions» to the great annoyance of Italy,
By 1933 a change had occurred in the Italian policy 
toward Ethiopia, Seeing that economic penetration was going
^F, r* Walters, A History of the Leap^e of Nations, 
Vol. II» Royal Institute oTTETSrn&tional Affairs, IfLondon: 
Oxford University Press, 1952), p, 62l|,
to \>à difficult# If not inqpoesible# thereby lesae Ing the 
chance for political control# Kuaaollnl turned toward the 
Idea of a railltary conquest# According to his later mili­
tary commander# do Bono# who headed the Invasion of Ethiopia 
In 1935# by 1933 Kusôollnl had decided war would be the 
only successful mesna of gaining control over Ethiopia#^
From that time on relations between Ethiopia and Italy be** 
gon to disintegrate# which caused both to prepare for war# 
Fearing a military attack on his country by the Italians# 
Halle Selassie askeo for an Italian reaffirmation of the 
Treaty of Friendship# On September 30# 193l|# the two gov­
ernments Issued a joint communique In which both reiterated 
their promises to cultivate friendly relations as a means 
of Augmenting reciprocal political and economic relations#^^ 
In light of the continued Italian military prepa­
rations# this proved to be nothing more than a hollow pledge# 
Mussolini realised the increased difficulty of concealing 
his military buildup in the two Italian colonies, and some 
pretext was needed to Justify the continuation of this
^Emilio de Bono# Anno XIIÎÎI: the Conquest of r.n 
Empire# (London: Crescent Ire»®# 1937)# pp# 13-17. Cited 
By f7 P# Walters# A El story of the Leaf^ue of Nations# Vol* 
II# Royal Institute of Intornat1cnal Affairs# (London: Ox­
ford University Press# 1952)# p# 6Zk*
^Elizabeth P# HAcCallma# Rivalries in Ethiopia# 
World Affairs Pamphlet No# 12# (New fork aniT^Boston; World 
Peace Foundation# 1935)# p# l]l#
policy#
The Wal Wal Dispute and Arbltratioh» Hla excuse 
came within two months of the September 30 communique, with 
the incident at Wal Wal between Italian and Ethiopian 
troops#
Wal Wal lies in what was a disputed area between 
Italian Somaliland and the Ethiopian province of Ogaden# 
Most of the boundary between Ethiopia and the Italian colo** 
nies of Eritrea and Somaliland had never been delimited, 
and border clashes had been frequent# Wal Wal was the 
sight of a number of wells and, although it waa occupied 
by the Italians, a number of official Italian maps placed 
the boundary several miles to the east# But the Ethiopian 
Government had not protested the presence of the Italians, 
and there had never been trouble in this area#^
This particular incident occurred on December S, 
193h# An Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission thajt had 
been working on the boundary between Ethiopia and British 
Somaliland had arrived at the area several days earlier, A 
misunderstanding developed between the Ethiopian troops ac^ 
companying the commission and the Italian garrison at the 
wells, and tempers began to run high on both sides# The 
British personnel evacuated the area to avoid involvement.
5Walters, p# 626#
but the Ethiopians and Italians began bringing up reinforce-^ 
ments# Finally, on the fifth, the inevitable shot was fired 
and an earnest battle ensued. The Italians were finally 
able to push the Ethiopians back, but not until both sides 
had suffered casualties larger than usually involved in 
these clashes.
On hearing of the incident, the Italian Government 
dispatched a protest to Addis Ababa, demanding apologies 
and compensations. The Italian oommander at Wal Wal was to 
be given a formal apology, the Italian flag waa to be salut­
ed, a monetary sum was to be paid to the Italians for loss
6of life, and the attackers were to be punishod.
The Government at Addis Ababa waa not prepared to 
accept these demands on this occasion because it felt that 
the area in which the disputes occurred had been in Ethiopian 
territory. Instead, the Ethiopian Government wished to place 
the entire matter under the Jurisdiction of Article 5 of 
the Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation, and Arbitration of 
1928, By its terms# both countries had agreed to submit 
any matters that could not be settled by normal diplomatic 
means to arbitration or conciliation#^
^League of Nations, Council, Official Journal, 
February, 1935# (Geneve! League of Nations, 1935), 'p'p# 272-73# Cited hereafter as L*N.O.J*»
7Ibid.. p* 272.
Such a step did not meet with Italian approval, how­
ever# because the Italian Government saw this as the pre­
text needed to justify its militant plans. On December 1^# 
the Italians officially refused to submit the dispute to 
the terms of the treaty# InslFtlng that In this particular 
ease there was no question of responsibility. The only 
solution acceptable to Italy would be for Ethiopia to ac­
knowledge the demands put forth in the Italian protest.^
When the Ethiopian Government received this reply# 
a telegram was immediately dispatched to the Secretary- 
General of the League of Eatlons# It called the Leaguers
attention to the gravity of the situation and accused the
gItalians of recent aerial bombardment of Ethiopian land#
In the note there waa no request for the issue to be placed 
on the Council*s agenda# although such a reservation was 
made in the event that the dispute could not be settled 
between Italy and Ethiopia.
The Italian Government then countered by sending 
its own version of the incident to the League of Katiens# 
and during the next two weeks both governments submitted 
more detailed reports# The Italians insisted that the
^Ibid., pp, 273-7U.
p, 27k,
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matter could be settled by direct diplomatic means, but con-*
tinned to insist that the settlement be on their terms*
The Ethiopian Government stated, in a telegram sent to the
League on December 31, th%t it would meet these demands If
an arbitration commission should find Ethiopia responsible,
but steadfastly refused to give in to any such demands until
the matter was submitted to arbitration*^^
During this time the Italian Government had in**
creased the tempo of its military preparations, and Haile
Selassie decided that the impasse must be broken for the de-*
fense of Ethiopia* On January 3, 193$, he requested that
the entire issue be placed on the agenda of the League
Council, through the provisions of Article 11 of the 
11Covenant#
It was January 17# however# before the Council 
placed the item on its agenda# and by the nineteenth, when 
it came up for discussion, the two governments had agreed 
to direct negotiations under the provisions of the Treaty 
of Friendship# In order to keep the League from becoming
June, 193‘J, p. 727.
^^Acoording to thl« Article, any threat of war waa 
declared a concern of the League# which was to take what­
ever action it considered necessary in order to maintain the peace* Any member had the right to bring any euch 
matters before the Assembly or the Council* For full text see Appendix# p# 122.
IX
Involved In the leeue# Italy dropped her demands for apolo­
gies and compensations^ But soon after these direct talks 
opened $ it became evident thf)t the two sides were not yet 
ready to reconcile their differences# The Ethiopians in­
sisted that the actual ownership of Wal Wal should be con­
sidered in order to determine responsibility, but the 
Italians were not ready to concede this imch* The nego­
tiations resulted in a deadlock which it was to the advan­
tage of Italy to maintain# Thus, as the talks continued, 
the military buildup in the Italian colonies waa carried on. 
Haile Selassie realiaod th«t the Italians were gaining a 
great advantage, and Insisted that the matter must be sub­
mitted to arbitration# This was refused by the Italians, 
who insisted that according to the Treaty of 1928, arbi­
tration would not be used until all direct efforts to reach 
a settlement had proved futile. As far as they were con­
cerned, this was not yet the case.
Finally, out of patience with the Italian», the 
Bxqperor of Ethiopia again turned to the League of Nations, 
and on March 17 requested that the entire dispute be placed
before the Council on the basis of Article 15 of the Cove- 
12nant# The Italians were charged with continuing their
12According to this Article, any dispute between 
members that was not settled or submitted to arbitration or 
judicial settlement, was to be aubsdtted to the Council# The
12
mobilisation of troops and material In the Italian colo­
nies, while refusing to enter Into any sincere negotia-' 
tions to bring about a settlement of the Wal Wal dispute# 
Ethiopia, finding herself with.no other alternative for her 
defense, considered It absolutely necessary to ask the Coun­
cil to investigate the dispute*^^
The Italian reply, which came on Karch 22, denied 
that the dispatch of troops to the Italian colonies consti­
tuted any threat to the peace# Italy waa merely taking 
steps for the defense of these areas# Furthermore, Italy 
had been waking every effort to achieve a just settlement, 
the reply continued, and had recently put forth fresh pro­
posals# In the event this phase of the negotiations should 
fall, however, Italy would accede to Ethiopians request 
that the matter be submitted to arbitration and cooperate 
in establishing an arbitration commission# In view of this 
promise, the Italian Govamment considered the matter out­
side of the application of Article 15# and insisted that any 
attempt to implement th%t article would be improper#
Council waa then to attempt to work out a settlement agree­
able to both parties# If this was not possible, then the 
Council was to submit a report to the members recommending 
what it considered to be Just and proper actions# For full 
text, see Appendix# p# 123.
Kay, 193?, p. 572* 
pp. 577-7Ü.
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Ethiopians appeal to have the Council consider the 
dispute was justified in view of the Italien obstructions 
to the negotiations, but the Council did not honor tho re­
quest# Unfortunately for Ethiopia, 0e;many at this time 
announced her intentions to raise an array by conscription, 
and the powers in the League wore more oonoerned with that 
ominous situation th&n with the Wal Wal dispute# There was 
little désiré to alienate Mussolini by considering the dis­
pute under Article 15# when there waa some hope that the 
two might finally resort to arbitration# At the Stress Con- 
forenpe, which was called to discuss German rearmament.
Great Britain and France remained officially silent on the 
African issue, which indicated to Mussolini that he would 
have his way#^^
Thus Ethiopia experienced her first defeat in the 
League, because politics took precedence over the princi­
ples of the Covenant# And, even if the smaller powers in 
the League had desired to see the dispute referred to Arti­
cle 15, they could have done notching without the support of 
either Great Britain or France#
The Government at Addis Ababa waé Saot fbéle^ by the 
promises In the Italian note of March 22 that Italy woujLd 
agree to arbitration. On March 29, Halle Selassie dispatched
^^Walters, p# 632*
XU
another note to the League^ in which It waa charged that 
the Italian proposals would be another occasion for delay# 
during which time the military threat to Ethiopia would be 
increased» Restating that the League would be Ethiopia’s 
defense from Italian aggressions^ it was suggested In the 
note that a time limit of thirty days should be placed on 
the arrangements to begin arbitration* Then# If the ccm^ 
mission for arbitration had not been appointed# the Council 
of the League would be charged with the responsibility of 
choosing the arbitrators# arranging the procedure# and de­
fining the limits of the commission*
The Council took no action on the suggestions In 
the Ethiopian note* On April 3# Ethiopia again requested 
the Council to consider the Item during the special session 
that had been called to examine the German announcement of 
conscription* Fearing that the Council might honor this 
request# Baron Àloisl# the Italian delegate# informed the 
Council that Italy was now ready to agree to arbitration* 
The Council took note of this announcement# and decided 
that# since an arbitration corantiisslon would at least be 
established# there was no need for the Council to consider 
the matter during Its special session# but that the matter
Kay, 1935, PP* 57h-?6*
15
17Wight be deferred until the next regular session in May#
In less than a month the Council received another 
notification from the Ethiopian Government that no progress 
waa being made# Thia time there had been no success in 
setting up the arbitration commission# because Ethiopia 
wanted the ownership of Wal Wal considered^ and because the 
Italians objected to the foreign nationals selected by 
Ethiopia as her representatives on the commission# Ethiopia 
again appealed to the League under the provisions of Article
15.^®
The Council then decided to make Its own appeal to 
the two governments to proceed with the arbitration before 
placing tho dispute on the agenda* Anthony Eden^ the Brit­
ish representative to the Council, was sent to talk to both 
aides and was able to gain compromises from both govern­
ments on the issues that had caused the delay, as well as 
an agreement on a time limit for the arbitration#
The Council then passed two resolutions on Kay 2$, 
one of which incorporated the agreements that Eden had 
been able to work out with the two governments, with a 
stipulation that, should the commission be unable to come
p. 550.
June, 1935, pp. 720-21.
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up with a settlement by July 2>, a fifth arbitrator would
be appointed# The other resolution stated that^ should no
agreement be reached by August 25# the Council would then
19meet and examine the situation# While this was not ccm* 
pletely satisfactory to Ethiopia^ since the Council would 
not be considering her request until August,, at least the 
Council was able to get the Italians to begin arbitration# 
However this was not the first occasion on which Italy had 
protested her willingness to work for a settlement, only to 
delay and obstruct later# Even if a settlement of the Wal 
Wal issue could have been effected now, there was no reason 
to believe that the real problem would be solved, for there 
would remain the animosity between the two countries, as 
well as the Italian plans for invasion# But the Council^s 
decision did mark a certain victory for Ethiopia, for now 
it had committed itself in the future, should the commission 
be unsuccessful#
The arbitration coimaission began its work on June 
25, after having met previously to organise# By July 9 it 
had reached a deadlock and suspended its meetings Indefi» 
nitely* The cause of this interruption was the old ques-» 
tlon of the commission^s powers# Both Governments inter­
preted those to be different, Ethiopia Insisting that the
p. 6I|0,
17
ooramiasion could consider the treaties relating to the bound*
aries# and Italy denying it any competence other than the
consideration of the frontier disputes since November*
20193î * Separate reports submitted to the Council by the 
Ethiopian arbitrators and the Ethiopian Government indicated 
that the deadlock could be broken only with the appointment 
of the fifth member# The Italians would not agree to this 
because they said the doadlock was due to Ethiopia*a demand 
that the comission exercise more power than it actually 
did*
The breakdown Invoked the Council*» decision to con^ 
eider the matter in such an events and on July 31 it met in 
a epeoial session for that purpose* It was becoming in^ 
creaslngly evident that Italy was little Interested In 
reaching any agreement* Mussolini had already turned down 
a British proposal for a settlement outside of tho League 
in which Ethiopia would relinquish Ogadon to the Italians 
for territory in British Somaliland, The Members of the 
League began to realise what Haile Selassie had known for 
some time* that#Italy needed more time before launching an 
attack, and thet all the negotiations had been giving her 
the needed time* The League knew that ft crucial test was
20<poynbee* p# 157♦
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coming, and tho Council ©oesied ready to take ©oïqo action, 
Alolal, however, waa deteriained to delay any Council study, 
and reminded the Council that under the provlalons of the 
Covenant it could not consider a question as long as it was 
still subject to arbitration» He threatened to boycott the 
Council if it wont alicad, which waa enough to persuade the 
Council to look again to the commission for its hopes of a 
settlement
Italy now agreed to the appointment of the fifth 
arbitrator, and the Council Instructed the eoiamiesion to
proceed without considering territorial considerations in
22the arbitration* Ihus by agreeing to the inclusion of 
the added arbitrator, Italy was able to keep the question 
of the ownership of Wal Wal out of consideration*
Ethiopians only consolation from this special ses-* 
Sion was another promise by the Council that in the future 
it would study the situation* This time it was to be at 
the September I4, moeting, when, regardless of the outcome of 
the arbitration, it would take up the examination of the 
relations between Italy and ia.tdiopla*^^
August, 1935* P* 966*
^^Ibld** p. 967#
p* 967.
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After the Council had finished this phase of its 
work* Pierre Laval* The French Foreign minister* and Eden 
addressed the meeting* Laval Informed the Council that he 
considered it had once more fulfilled its "great and nohlo 
mission" which would cause the supporters of the League to 
rejoice* .E© said he realised that only the immediate task 
had been accomplished* however* and thifc the serious aitua^ 
would prompt him in the future to do all in hla power to 
utilise conciliation to bring the two together#
Eden then announced that such an attempt would be 
xa&de in the very near future* Italy* France*, and Great 
Britain* as^ signatories to the Agreement of 1906 ooncern- 
ing Ethiopia* would soon open negotiations with a view "to 
facilitating a solution of the differences between Italy 
and Ethiopia*" H©-would report the outcome of these meet-* 
Inga to the Council at its next session* He firmly hoped* 
be went on* that by that time their differences would be 
settled*
With these developments* the first phase of the 
dispute was ended* The Council thus far had circumvented 
the issue* being unwilling to commit itself too deeply#
^ Ibld.. p. 969. 
p. 969.
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Porhapa this was beoauaa It a maiobera were not yet complete*» 
ly convinced that the dispute would lead to a war* but 
probably higher in their thoughts was the ominous turoat of 
an aggressive Germany* Phis threat to their own safety pre­
cluded a wholehearted concern for Ethiopia* In line with 
this reasoning* Italy was considered too valuable an ally 
to risk losing because she had already demonstrated her con­
cern for security in Ikirope. France was particularly pro­
tective toward her over since Laval had had his talks with 
Mussolini in Januax»y of 1935# Closer cooperation than there 
had been for sozne time had been now established between 
France and Italy* Whether or not Italy's African designs 
were mentioned at that time it still disputed* but it Is 
not inconceivable that Laval did give î*îussolinl some kind 
of assurances in light of Laval's later actions.
In any event* Mussolini* through the series of de­
lays ho maneuvered* was ablo to gain the time required for 
the final preparations for the military invasion of Ethiopia, 
By prolonging the direct negotiations to the point of 
Ethiopia's exasperation* time was gained* and* when the 
Leac^e began to become Involved* he was able to keep the 
Council from studying the situation by agreeing to arbitra­
tion, This last step made possible further delays* until 
he was able to gain seven months in which to make ready his
21
«Lggreaalon* H© used diplomacy to his great advantage and 
was able to deny to Ethiopia the support of the League 
during this crucial stage of their relations.
CHAJt'TEa II
m s  IKAGÜS asms a soiütioiî
When the Counoll adjourned on August 3# 193&# hopes 
for a peaceful settlement were high# Although the Wal Wal 
Incident had not been suocesafully arbitrated yet# the ap­
pointment of the fifth arbitrator was eao^eoted to break the 
deadlock and remove th#t issue from the relations between 
Italy and Ethiopia# A second hopeful sedative was the ex­
pectation voiced by M e n  that the scheduled negotiations 
between Great Britain^ Prance, and Italy would be able to 
reconcile the two sides# The general knowledge that Italy 
was after more then she had publicly stated caused concern# 
but, if she did not demand too much, perhaps Ethiopia could 
be coerced into meeting Italy on the latter*» ground* Per­
haps the British hnd the French would be able to grant to 
Ethiopia sufficient compensations to make the entire deal 
less offensive to Ethiopian sovereignty#
If a settleinent in line with the principles of the 
Covenant was expected# this three-power attempt to settle 
the question was really a reversion to methods that had 
gone-out of date# It would have been made outside of the 
League of Nations, and because Ethiopia was a member in
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good etandingi ah« ahould at least have been allowed to 
participate In the discussions# The fear of another con** 
tlnental war# however# concerned all Europeans# particular­
ly the French# and the recent occurrences in Germany were 
causing considerable concern# The fear of German militar­
ism had a profound Influence on French thinking about the 
Covenant^ Since It had been a part of the Treaty of Ver­
sailles# France tended to consider It as one of the guaran­
tees against German aggression. Feeling this way# she was 
not anxious to see the League become preoccupied in a con­
troversy with** ftftly# for any long or unsuccessful involve­
ment there might render it ineffective against Germany.
France had a southern frontier and# in the event of 
a war with Germany# Italy would be a necessary ally to 
France in any dispute with her historic enemy# Consequent­
ly# the spirit of the Covenant was disregarded# and the con­
troversy was transferred from the Council to a small group# 
with the prospective aggressor# but not the victim# includ­
ed*^ As one writer put it# **Halle Selassie was left like 
the birds in the air# with no one but God to look after 
him#^
Eden had promised to report the outcome of these 
negotiations to the Council# In accordance with the second
^Walters# p# 638#
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resolution or,3îuguat 3# 1935# the Council w t  on September 
I4. to look into the entire controversy between Italy and 
Ethiopia* The British representative was the flrat to 
speak* and* after his introductory remarks, he reported on 
the three-power talks th^t h^d transpired in Paris on Au­
gust 16* He said that Italy had refused to list her demands
on Ethiopia, but that, in an attempt to reach some agree-
2ment, France and Britain had put forth some proposals*
By their terms, Ethiopia would have been asked to 
accept a plan for the complete reorganisation of her in­
ternal life. This would have been done with the help of 
foreign advisors, who would have been appointed by the 
League of Nations* Because France, Great Britain, and 
Italy held areas contiguous to Ethiopia, these three would 
have been particularly veil suited to supervise such a pro­
gram# This general plan of reorganization included such 
things as economic, financial, commercial and construction­
al development; foreign settlement; modernization of ad­
ministrative agencies; anti-slavery measures; and frontier 
and other police services# An attempt was made to give 
Italy special consideration in the proposals, for Eden said 
thst the collective nature of the assistance to Ethiopia
J», Nov. 1935; p. 113)1.
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In reforming her internal life would not preclude taking 
Into account the special Interests of Italy* Furthoz^iore^ 
while the question was not examined* the proposals did not 
In any way exclude the possibility of a territorial adjust»» 
ment# although such adjustment would have to be agreeable 
to Ethiopia# Ho specific area was mentioned In the scheme#^ 
In closing# Eden said that these negotiations had ended In 
failure# and then he warned that the Eeague %mst find some 
settlement# unless the League * s authority were to be lessened 
in future disputes#
Laval followed Eden In addressing the Council and 
echoed his colleague^a account of the failure of the Paris 
talks* While he took pooaalon to declare that France rocog-' 
nlsed the binding character of the Covenant, he returned to 
the same theme of conciliation that he had emphasised at 
the Counoll*s meeting on August 3# From the tone of his 
speech# it was obvious that he laid more emphasis upon his 
eagerness to play the part of the conciliator# than upon 
any concern to exercise his Influence In upholding the 
Covenant* Perhaps this was due to a conviction that a set* 
tlement outside of the League could be achieved# but on the 
other hand this, desire to side-step the League was probably 
prompted by the desire to keep Italy placated# which would
3ibld., p. 113U.
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be much easier te do without having to consider the pro- 
eeduree called for in the league of Nations*
At any rate# the lE^ortant thing to Laval then was 
to maintain the so-»oalled Stresa Fronts which protested 
Germanyreturn to conscription* To do this# Italy must 
be shown every consideration# In closing# Laval told the 
Council that he trusted an equitable settlement would be 
reached that would "insure to Italy the satisfaction which 
she might legally claim, without failing to recognize the 
essential rights of Ethiopian sovereignty#"^! Ho did not de­
fine what he called "essential rights"*
If hopes for a peaceful settlement were dixnmed with 
the failure of the faris negotiations just reported on# 
there was a greater gloom caused by the Italian reaotioït to 
the results of the Wal Val arbitration* After the fifth 
member had been chosen# and the Council had instructed the 
arbitrators not to consider territorial questions# an agree^ 
ment was finally possible* The commission unanimously re­
ported that neither Italy nor Ethiopia could be held re­
sponsible for causing the incident# and now, fresh hopes 
bloomed. Might this hot be a basis for a rapprochement be­
tween Italy and Ethiopia?
kibld.. p. 1135,
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Italy»s representative# Alolsi# took tha platform 
on September Ii# to give tho answer# He informed the mem-* 
bars that the Wal Wal settlement was of no great consequence 
to Italy# who had suffered too long from Ethiopian trana-» 
gresaion* To show the world the great outrages Italy had 
suffered at the hands of Ethiopia# the Italian Government 
had prepared an indictment which would be presented to the 
Council# It would show why Italy had been unable to accept 
the proposals put forth at Parla* It would set forth numer­
ous reasons why Italy felt Ethiopia had systematically vio­
lated all the conventional undertakings she had assumed 
towards Italy and the League of Hâtions# He promised that 
the members of the Council would find irrefutable proof of 
the unfriendly attitude adopted by the Ethiopian Government 
in the Italian Mémorandum that would sat forth Italy*s 
grievances# He told them that Italy could no longer con-> 
tlnue to place undeserved confidence in the Ethiopian Gov­
ernment# and charged that Italy was forced to consider 
Ethiopia a barbarous state# no longer justified in claiming 
membership in the League of Hâtions or any rights under the 
Friendship Treaty of 1928*^
Ho declared that It had been a mistake ever to
%bld.. pp. 1135-37.
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admit Ethiopia to the League# She had not fulfilled her 
obligations to put an end to slavery# to halt illegal arma 
traffic# to curb internal disorder# and to live at peace 
with her neighbors* It was now ii^gpossible for Italy to 
consider auch a state an equal any longer# and by interna­
tional interpretation of aggression Italy would have had 
every right to go to war# But Itely had not done that and 
had shown forbearance instead, only to suffer bloodshed 
from an enemy *^whose bad faith had never been controverted# 
and that no policy of confidence, no demonstration or treaty 
of friendship had succeeded in changing her#”^
Aloisi suggested Italy’s future course when be said 
that, in a question such as this that affected the vital 
interests and security of the Italian colonies, Italy would 
fall her most elementary duty if she did not cease putting 
any trust in Ethiopia# and reserve to herself the right of 
adopting any measures necessary to safeguard her own inter­
ests and the security of her African colonies#^
Those who hoped that the settlement of the Wal Wal 
incident would lead to better relations between Italy and 
Ethiopia realised they had been hoping in vain* Alolsi’s 
speech introduced the next phase in the dispute# for this
Ibid.A p. 1137.
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Avowal of the Italian Government indicated It was shifting 
ground and doing all It could to destroy any basis for a 
settlement* Since the ¥al Wal dispute had outlived its 
usefulness, Italy was tundng to a new method of excusing 
her actions* Ihia attempt to completely discredit Ethiopia 
in the eyes of the League and the world# If successful# 
might Isolate her from all help in her struggle with Italy, 
but# even if it did not accomplish this end# It could still 
be useful* Such an indictment would cause the League to 
investigate the charges# thereby giving Italy a little more 
time to prepare for the invasion of Ethiopia# before the 
Council would take any action on behalf of the intended 
victim#
H* Jéze# the Ethiopian representative, indicated 
surprise at the indictment# reminded the Council that 
for the past nine months lih© Government of Ethiopia had 
constantly affirmed Its desire to achieve a peaceful set* 
tlement and establish cordial relations with Italy# and# 
notwithstanding the latest Italian charges# the Ethiopian 
Government wished to renew that pledge#® He recalled the 
history of the entire dispute# pointing out that Italy# and 
not Ethiopia# had been the party always reluctant to see any
^Ibld.. p. 1137.
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Improvement In relations# Italy had continually held that 
Ethiopia had no case, and every time an appeal had been 
made to the League the Italians had always found exouses 
for delay# Italy was just stallirg for tlme^ and the 
charges sat forth In the memorandum were only a new pre­
text to excuse unilateral action by Italy# He regretted 
that time had not allowed Ethiopia to reply to the Italian 
charges# but# until this could bo done# he pleaded with the 
Council to remember that time did not allow for dilatory 
measures# The Council*s paramount duty was to prevent a 
war of extermination that could com© any day# This should 
take precedence over any Investigation of the charges In 
the mcmorandxnn#^
Perhaps the best answer to the Italian charges was 
given by Maxim Litvinoff, the Russian delegate# Rising In 
defense of Ethiopia^ he challenged the Italian request for 
the Council to declare its disinterestedness and to grant 
the Italian demand for freedom of action# He charged the 
Italians with inviting the members of the Council to re­
pudiate their international obligations and the Covenant* 
Italy still threatened Ethiopia even though the Wal Wal 
settlement eliminated any concrete dispute, and therefore
9ibid., p, nij.2.
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the meuibers could not forget the principles of the Covenant 
and IghOre the exletenoe of th-% threat# That would be a 
violation in itself of the Covenant^ and a further weaken-* 
Ing of the League of Nations# Another failure would stimu-* 
late conflicts directly affecting Europe# and to fail Ethl-* 
opia would be inviting dlsaater#^^ Itely’s ’•civilising 
action” would not be a Justification for war and# unless 
the Council did all in its power to avert an armed conflict 
between two members of the Lea^e# It would not be accom-* 
pushing the raison d^ et*re of the League itaelf*^^
There was no tone of appeasement or conciliation in 
Litvlnoff^s speech# and to follow such advlpe must have 
been a frightening prospect to those who felt that the dia-* 
pute would best be settled by some agency other than the 
Council* Litvlnoff# however# stood alone in speaking for 
Ethiopia at that meeting of the Council because the other 
representatives were not ready to commit their governments 
to any action unwelcome to Italy#
The memorandum submitted by the Italian Government 
was a lengthy «tt03xç>t thoroughly to discredit Ethiopia in 
the eyes of her fellow nations# complete with pictures#
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tefitimouîest and eye vltneee aocounte# It set forth Italy*s 
grievance® In groat detail*. In the first place it charged 
Ethiopia with failing to carry out treaty agreements with 
Italy and her obligations to the Covenant| it listed inci­
dents considered by Italy to have been outrages against 
Italian diplomats# consuls# Italian subjects# and colonies; 
it presented orgujsents that Italy must consider Ethiopia in­
capable of continuing as a member of the League; it charged 
Ethiopia with continuing to practice slavery; it accused the 
Ethiopian Government of allowing illegal arms traffic; and 
it pointed Out examples of Ethiopia's failure to perform 
the duties of League membership# hp^aking in Italy's de­
fense# the memorandum stated that for Italy to put an end 
to such Intolerable circumstances would not be a violation 
of the Covenant# but# on the contrary, Italy would be de-
12fending the prestige and good hame of the League of Katlons* 
Ethiopia's answer to these charges was submitted to 
the League on September ll| In the form of coimenta by K#
Marcel Griale# an individual whom thé Italian Government 
had referred to in the memorandum as being a scientific 
authority on conditions in Ethiopia* He questioned the 
memorandum's authenticity on various grounds and concluded
IZibld., Hot., 1935. PP. 1355-86.
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that many of tha charges were \infounded*^^
However, despite tha fact that It was shown sub se-* 
quently that tha memorandum* s accusations wore inaccurate 
in a number of respects, the public was greatly influenced 
at the time* According to Walters, It provided an excel*- 
lent excuse for the pro-Italian factions, who were urging 
that the quarrel was a matter that should be settled solely 
between the two countries, to come to Italy's defens 
The charges in the memorendum had the further effect of plac­
ing Ethiopia in an embarrassing position* It was common 
knowledge that social evils still existed within the Empire, 
but no credit had been ĵ iven to the. efforts that Haile 
Selassie had been making to correct them* Ethiopia was now 
the accused, and. In the time interval required for Ethiopia 
to draft the reply submitted on September II4, the Italians 
reaped benefits* Hot only was Ethiopians integrity tempo­
rarily in question, but also the Oouncil decided to attempt 
to find a solution through conciliation, a process that 
gave Italy more time*
In spite of placing Ethiopia on tho defensive with­
in the League of Nations by discrediting her, the Italian
13ibld.. pp. 1S8?3-9!u  
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Goverraaent could ctlll not justifiably declare war# Italy 
wanted Ethiopia to be expelled from the League^ a fact that 
Is evidenced by the speech made by Aloisi as well as by the 
memorandum# One® denied membership^ Italy hoped Ethiopians 
defenders would be few# The Italian Government apparently 
thought that League sentiment would be less damiing In an' 
aggression against a non-member# but even in such a case 
Italy would be violating tne Covonant# because of the pro­
visions of Article 17»^^ Ethiopia would certainly have 
claimed for herself the rights granted in this article to 
a non-member# In such a ease^ she would enjoy technical 
membership during the course of the dispute# and the artl-* 
cles dealing with acts of aggression would be as binding on 
Italy as if Ethiopia were still a member in good standing#
Litvinoff* s remarks were a reminder to the members of this 
16condition#
At tha second meeting of the Council on September 5# 
Jeae made a fresh appeal to the Council to take action# 
again under the provisions of Article 1$ of the Covenant#
^ I n  any dispute between a member and a non-member# 
or between non-mombers# those states were Invited to accept 
the obligations of membership# and in that event# the pro- 
violons of Articles 12 to 16 were to extend to such states#
^^Supra, p. 31.
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by which tha League was to endeavour to effect settlements 
of dispute3 The means to Implement the provisions of 
Article 15 caused considerable controversy in the Council# 
with Aloisi and Jeze engaging in bitter arguments* The 
decision was m^de on the same day to appoint a committee 
composed of five of the Council*e members to attempt to work 
out an agreement# but not until the strong Italian protest 
had been overcome by personal negotiations on the sixth did 
the c(%mlttee actually come into existence* At the regular 
meeting of the Council on September 6 the Committee of Five
was charged with undertaking the general examination of the
18conflict and attempting to find a basis for agreement#* 
Aloisi abstained from voting#
The OcKianittee of Five was composed of the United 
Kingdom# France# Poland# Spain# and Turkey# It had its 
first meeting on September 7# 1935# but# before relating 
Its activities from then until September 21;.# attention must 
be turned to the Assembly of the League of Katlons# which 
was to open its debate on the ninth#.
The world realised that the Council*a decision to 
investigate the dispute through the Committee of Five would
Hov., 1935, P. 11^2,
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launch tha League's attempt to bring Itfîly and Ethiopia to-* 
gether* But there waa etill uncertainty over what the 
League of Nations would do In the event Italy Invaded 
Ethiopia# and all expected the Assembly debates to answer 
this question» Would Italy be told that an act of aggres­
sion would be met by sanctions imposed by the League or 
would hesitancy and indecision prompt Italy to go ahead?
Actual debate began on September 11# with Sir Samuel 
Hoare# the British Foreign Secretary# making the first 
speech»^^ Initially# Hoare spoke of che deep attachment 
the people of Great Britain had to the League of Nations# 
and stated that all were Interested in a settlement.
Then he spoke out for the principles of the Covenant 
and assured the Assembly that Great Britain would support 
the League in whatever action it might take* His Govern­
ment felt that the League and its ideals were the most ef­
fective means of maintaining the peace# and for thmt reason 
the League must be preserved*
Ho let it be known# however# that British support 
of the League would not be unqualified* To dispel any 
doubts# he Insisted that Great Britain would not bear the
^^League of Nations# Assembl"^ Official Journal# 
Special Supplement 138> (Geneva: 1933), pp. '
Cited hereafter as
77
reaponalbiXitlea and rlaka alone * and that in suoh a eol^ 
lective effort to maintain the peace the burden must also 
be borne collectively. Should the members cooperate In en­
forcing the Covenant* Great Britain's support would be as­
sured#
Hoare's words did much to dispel fears throughout 
Europe that the League might not successfully meet the 
Italian threat^ thereby destroying its own effectiveness.
It was recognised that the League could never be effective 
without Great Britain's support* and now this avowal indi­
cated that the League could count on Great Britain, At 
last one of the big powers had openly committed Itself to 
the League* and courage came to other governments to take 
the same resolve#
The groat remaining doubt was over the speculation 
of what the French policy would be* and Laval was one of 
the last to speak. His first remarks were encouraging to 
all who desired to see the League stand firm. He indicated 
that France was loyal to the Covenant and would not fail 
her obligations in this instance* He pictured the League 
of Nations as a creation of all who desired peace* and said 
the Covenant was the ^International law™ of France# Franca would
pp. 65-66.
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never allow the Covenant to be weakened* so Prance, like 
Great Britain* aeemed ready to give the League her wholes* 
hearted support#
But beyond thla facade Intended for public oonsump** 
tlon* Laval then went on to discuss Pranco-Italian rela-* 
tionshlps# He reminded the Assembly that on January 7, 1935# 
he and Mussolini had conducted talks during which the two 
countries had **roach0d a final settlement of all#♦ ♦differ­
ences’** Because Italy*s friendship was valued bo highly, 
he had left nothing undone to maintain this friendship#
For that reason, he said, he had spared no efforts at con­
ciliation and in the present activities of the Council he 
would once more have the satisfaction of fulfilling the 
same duty#
As it later turned out, the significant passagos In 
Laval*s speech were not those reaffirming French intentions 
to carry out the Covenant, but rather those touching on the 
relationships with Italy# For the third time, Laval pub­
licly pronounced in effect that Prance would support the 
League of Nations only after all hopso for a settlement 
through conciliation were gone, and, to the very end, Laval 
refused to acknowledge that such a method of settlement 
would not succeed# With the warm references to Italy, his 
must have been a very reluctant promise that France would
39
stand on the aide of the Lea^o of nations*
Other roprssentatlvas continued to speak on behalf 
of the Covenant* Some of the speeches were almost pro­
phétie, although perhaps Judging them now in light of what 
happened makes them seem so» The speech made by the dele« 
gate from Portugal, Senhor Konteiro, deserves comment 
Ha expressed the opinion that collective security was of 
little value if it did not protect the independence of all 
nations against conquest or against decisions not freely 
accepted# He said, must say that there is one thing 
that I loathe even more than war, and that is spoliation 
by procedure•'* Oartainly Ethiopia*s fate was determined 
in 1936 with spoliation by the procedures of conciliation I 
There had already been evidence of spoliation of a sort in 
the advantage Italy had maintained in the world organisa­
tion, where she had been able to delay formal Council con­
sideration of the dispute, but the greatest spoliation had 
not yet occurred*
Lltvinoff also spoke to the Assembly during this 
phase of its debate, giving Russian support to any actions 
that the League might take against Italy»^^ His tone
Zlibld,. p. 71.
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lndicA.ted« however» that he wae not coxrqpletely convinced 
that» when the ehowdown came# the same epirlt shown in 
these meetings would still prevail» ^e said that# if the 
various govermeflofca «would fulfill the pledges Just given to 
allow no Illegal aggression regaMless of the origin or the 
object# the Assembly then would become a landmark in the 
League»s history*
With the key words# **if** and "they*^# emphasised# 
did Litvinoff already know that Great Britain and France 
had agreed on September 10 that# should sanctions be neo-* 
essary# their use would be limited to non-military sanc­
tions y In anyvpvent# this was the case# as Laval later re­
ported to the Chamber of Deputies# On that date# he and 
Eoare discussed the entire situation and agreed that their 
respective governments would not support military sanctions# 
any naval blockade# closure of the Sues Canal# or any other 
measure that might lead the^ into a war with Italy#^^
Had the Assembly known of this secret agreement# 
the new-found faith that the League of Hat ions would stand 
against Italy would have been shattered and certainly lit­
tle i%%>ortance would have been attributed to the public 
statements of Hoare and Laval in the Assembly# It was from
23Toynbee# pp# 183-Gk#
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Hthis time In September untllvthe entire issue wae .settled 
with the Italian victory that the muddled policy of states 
In Sind out of the League became so evident# It was an un^ 
realistic policy because Its success depended on neither 
the League’s nor Italy’s suffering a defeat^ an impossible 
situation which could end only as it did#
The Italian reply to the debates in the Aasenibly 
was made In an official communique issued after the Italian 
Cabinet meeting on September 11|#^^ Tlie Cabinet raeêlved 
the speeches with the greatest calm# since it felt that the 
French and British positions could not have been different 
from what they were# Italy was pleased with the cordial 
words Laval had for the Franco-Italian agreements of 1935# 
and the friendship between the two countries# The commun! 
que wont on to say that Italy intended to develop that 
friendship in the interest of the two countries and European 
collaboration# This friendship would not be broken by a 
colonial conflict or by the use of sanctions#
But the threat of sanctions caused the Cabinet some 
concern# or otherwise there would not have been a warning 
to the blague of Kations thmt their application would render
^^The Times# September 16# 1935# Cited in Stephen 
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continued Italian jwernberahlp In the ^eague Impossible# As 
far as the Italian Cabinet was concerned# the ItalO'-Sthlopian 
dispute could never be settled by coitq)remise# and# in view 
of tha efforts and sacrifices already made by Italy and the 
"Irrefutable documentation" In the Italian memorandum# only 
one solution was possible»^^
Had the Italians known of the September 10 agree^» 
mont between Laval and Hoare# they would have been less 
concerned# but they were preparing for any eventualities# 
Killt&ry preparation In Last Africa was procoeding with 
greater intensity and war material production was being in­
creased with all possible speed# It was obvious that the 
Italian Government had decided not to back down no matter 
what course the Council might take#
The Committee of Five had been meeting since Sep­
tember 7 in what later proved to be another unsuccessful 
attempt to reconcile the disputants* Eleven days after its 
first session it had worked out a plan for a settlement 
which was submitted to Italy and E t h i o p i a # I n  its re­
port# the Committee stated that It had been guided by an 
obligation to respect Ethiopian sovereignty and at the same
^^Ibld.. p* 106.
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time maintain good relations between members of the Leagueé 
Also» it decided to ezpreso no'opinions on the documents 
that the two governments had submitted» and to confine it^ 
self to the situation which demanded a remedy» The report 
recalled the conditions upon which Ethiopia was admitted to 
the League and the obligations she had assumed regarding 
slavery and arms traffic# At that time» Ethiopia had prom­
ised to consider any recommendations that might be made to 
her by the League concerning these practices#
As recently as September 11» the report continued» 
the first delegate from Ethiopia told the Assembly that his 
government would view with gratitude any suggestions pro­
ceeding from the League that wore calculated to raise the 
social» economic» and political level of Ethiopia# In view 
of this and to enable her to live at peace with her neigh^ 
borSf the Committee of Five had devised a plan that it 
hoped would be in line with the duties of the League# How­
ever this proposed plan of assistance would have to be ac­
ceptable to the Ethiopian Government#
Under this plan there were provisions for the re­
organisation of internal affairs in Ethiopia# Foreign 
specialists were to organise police services which would be 
responsible for controlling slavery and arms traffic» po­
licing areas with a predominantly foreign population, in­
suring security in areas where local police facilities were
Inadequate, and maintaining order in frontier areas* Eoo- 
nomlo reorganisation called for foreign participation In 
the economic development of Ethiopia, placing foreign trade 
on a basis of reciprocity and allowing foreign assistance 
in establishing more adequate communication facilities. 
Financial reorganisation provided for assistance in draw^ 
Ing up the budget and supervising expenditures, assessing 
and collecting revenues, establishing and operating fiscal 
monopolies, and studying possibilities for loans for in-* 
ternal development. Judicial reorganization made provl^ 
along for establishing mixed courts for foreign use and 
native courts for domestic use.
To carry out this plan, each of the services nen^ 
tloned would be headed by an individual or a commission re­
sponsible to the League of Nations, These would be joint­
ly appointed by the Council and the Emperor, with the re­
maining staffs to be appointed by the Emperor upon nomina­
tion by the Counoll# The chief advisor or commission of 
each of the;services would report once a year to both the 
League and the Emperor, and the latter would be authorized 
to submit reports as he saw fit* No time limit for the 
duration of the plan was mentioned, but, if continued in 
use, the Oouncil would review its effectiveness at five 
year Intervals*
Acoorapanying the plana for reorganization was an 
offer of territorial adjuatmente* Prance and Great Britain 
proposed to grant Ethiopia concessions from their respective 
holdings along the Somaliland coast. In return for Ethiopian 
concession of the areas of Ogaden and Danakil to Italy. 
Furthermore, the two governments Informed the Committee of 
Five that they would not object to recognizing special 
economic interests of Italy In Ethiopia, as long as existing 
rights and treaty agreements were not violated#
This attempted settlement was unlike the one pro­
posed at the Paris negotiations in that Ethiopian adminis^ 
trativo agencies would be under League, rather than three- 
power, supervision, but it was reminiscent of the former 
proposals as far as territorial exchanges were concerned# 
This time the area of Danakil had been added to the pay­
ment that France and Great Britain were ready to make to 
buy .off Italy» Eovever the plan did not make Ethiopia a 
virtual protectorate of Italy, and that was the only set­
tlement Mussolini would accept.
Because Ethiopian sovereignty was left pretty much 
intact, Haile Selassie was prepared to accept the Coimit- 
tee’s plan as a basis for further negotiations# Ko advan­
tage was ever taken of this concession#
On September 18, Mussolini told a representative of
kh
the Dall;y Me 11 that the n w  proposals were not only unac­
ceptable, but also d e r i s o r y ; ^7
The suggestion Is apparently made th&t Italy^s 
need for expansion in East. Africa should b® met by 
the cession to her of a couple of deserts - one salt, 
the other of stone,#.*It looks as If the Committee 
of the League thinks I am collector of deserts*
I got 110,000 square mile» of Saharan desert from 
the French a little while ago* Do you know how 
many Inhabitants there are in the Whole desolate 
area? Sixty-two*
The official Italian reply was received by the 
League on September 21* It was a rejection of the plan.
The corwaunique stated that the Cabinet had examined vhe 
proposals, and appreciated the efforts, but considered them 
unacceptable* The Cabinet felt that not enough considera­
tion had been given to the Italian rights and interests in 
the entire matter*^®
On the 22nd, Aloicl commented more explicitly on 
the Italian rejection at a meetlnj^ of the Council. H© 
justified his government♦a rejection bn the grounds that 
41) the Committee had not given full consideration to the 
charges in the Italian memorandum; 42) Ismcdiato action was 
required to alleviate the condition of the exploited natives 
in Ethiopia; (3) the proposals did not go for enough to
^^Toynbea, p* 19$.
23Documents on International Affairs* 193$, Vol*
II, P. 119:
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protect Ethiopians neighbors; (U) in a country where bar-# 
barlsm was accompanied by powerful armament# both the League 
and Italy must take action; (5) the Covenant was not the 
means through which a solution could be reached because 
Ethiopia no longer deserved to demand rights under it;
(6) the plan# as conceived by the Committee# did not allow 
for any control of the Ethiopian array; (7) the suggested 
territorial changes would allow Ethiopia access to the sea, 
further magnifying her threat to Italy, and (8) Italy could 
not put faith in any agreements to be made with Ethiopia, 
a state which did,not honor her treaty obligations,^^
With this Italian rejection of the Committee of 
Five’s efforts, the plan never became more than an academic 
consideration# Since the plan had actually answered the 
Italian grievances to a great extent, Italy’s rejection 
further indicated that nothing but the complete control of 
Ethiopia would satisfy her ambitions*
Haile Selassie realized that this position was be-* 
coming more desperate, and, in another attempt to get fur­
ther League support, ho announced the creation of a thirty 
kilometer wide neutral zone along the Italian colonial fron­
tiers# He asked that the League immediately dispatch
29L.IT.O.J*# Hov#, 1935, pp# 1625-26#
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observers to this area to ascertain that Ethiopia was not 
in any aggressive actions#^^ Events, however, 
were moving so rapidly that this proposal was never uti­
lised#
The Oommittee of Five reported to the Council ex­
pressing its failure to come up with an acceptable solution 
on September 21̂ , and two days later the Council met to act
onunder paragraph k, of l3* dinco the Committee of
Five had been unsuccessful, the Council was obligated to 
publish a report containing Its recommendations* For this 
purpose, the Council resolved Itself into the Committee of 
Thirteen and began its work#
During the interval between September 26 and Octo­
ber 5 $ when the Committee of Thirteen was at work, poten­
tialities beoaiae realities* Ethiopia declared general mo­
bilisation on September 28, and the Italian iwaaion of 
Ethiopia was launched on October 3# The Secretary-General 
of the League of Hawions was informed by the Government of
'ipEthiopia of the impending hostilities on the second,and, 
in a later telegram the next , the Italian Government
30lbld,. p. 1189.
31por full text see Appendix, p. 123
Bov., 1935. p. 1603.
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informed the Secretary-General that its military forces had 
been forced to act in the defense of the Italian colonies*-33
The Italian telegram stated that the Ethiopian mo­
bilisation and the creation of the neutral zone* which had 
been nothing more than a strategic move to prepare an at­
tack against It%ly* had forced the Italian High Command in 
Eritrea to act In defense# With these events the war had 
begun# Now the League of Nations was faced with the addi­
tional problem of open warfare#
The Councilf as the Committee of Thirteen# rendered 
its report on October 5#^^ It recounted the entire history 
of the dispute# particularly as It had effected the League 
of Nations# It retold the story of Wal W&l and the attempts 
at arbitration; it discussed Ethiopia*s conduct since 1923# 
and rejected the Italian case in the memorandum in Its es­
sential points# It mentioned the Italian refusal to coop­
erate# and the failure of the Committee of Five# Walters 
described it as *the judgment of thirteen states thit 
reached conclusions completely unfavorable to the Italian 
case#*3^ even though moat of the thirteen were anxious not
33ibld.. p. 1603.
3Uibld.. pp, 1605-19»
^^alte?a, p, 653.
so
to alienate Italian sentiment#
In that light of the open warfare^ the Council rec-* 
owmended that for the time being the viol(?tion of the Cove­
nant should be brought to an end, and reserved the right to 
make subsequent recommond&tions as to how this would be done* 
Italy offered no new line of resistance to the Coun­
cil's decision* She followed the same line that she had 
since the middle of September by contending that the Coun­
cil had not given consideration to the injustices Italy had 
suffered at the hands of Ethiopia, In neglecting Italy^s 
case, the Council had allowed Ethiopia to come before it as 
a victim, and ^artificial alarmist agitation** had led to 
the absurd result th^t the j&thlopian menace to Italy was 
transformed Into an Italiah menace to Ethiopia* Italian 
operations had been quite legitimate in view of the mobi­
lisation order. As long as Ethiopia aggressive attitudes 
wore allowed to continue, there could never be a just solu­
tion of the dispute
The Ethiopian delegate accepted the Council*s re­
port, and appealed to It to take action against Italy under 
the provisions of Article 16 of the C o v e n a n t . H e
HOT., 1932, p. 1212.
37Artlcle 16 was the moat important Article In the 
entire scheme of collective security as was envisioned in 
the Covenant* When a state was declared an aggressor all
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contended that.Italy had resorted to war In violation of 
her obligations to the League of Hat Ions ̂ thereby bring-*
Ing into force Article 16* He requested the Council to de­
clare that Italy had resorted to war within the meaning of 
the CovenantI that her resort to war had^ l^ao facto, 
brought about the consequences of the first paragraph of 
the Article* H@ asked the Council to fulfill its obliga­
tions evolving out of Article 16 by bringing the hoat111- 
ties to a close as soon as possible*
The Council appointed from its members a Committee 
of Six to study the latest events and to advise the Coun­
cil of all the matters Involved* This committee had to 
determine two fundamental questions; did a state of war 
exist* and* if so* was it in disregard of thé Covenant?
To determine the answers it considered the events occurring 
since October 2* and with great speed It reported on Octo­
ber 7*^^
The report called attention to the fact that a
members of the League were to cease intercourse with that 
state and its nationals* The Council ootald recommend that 
military action could be taken against the Covenant break­ing state* For full text, see Appendix, p. 12ii.
hÆildj.» 1935# p. 1?13.
^^Ibld.f pp, 1223-2$, Members were Groat Britain, 
Chile* Denmark* France* Portugal* and Rumania*
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nation did not have the authority to go to war without first 
having complied with the provisions of Articles 12, 13# and 
l^^UO these Articles It was the duty of all members
of the League of Katlons to submit disputes to arbitration# 
judicial settlement# or Council inquiry# and under Article 
12, the members could not resort to war within three months 
after one of the above provisions had been met* The appli­
cable date in this case was September l|# 1935# The adop­
tion of war by Italy as a means of ending her dispute with 
Ethiopia was therefore in violation of the Covenantg Italy*( 
charge that she had had to act in self defense was not ten­
able# because the adoption of internal measures of security 
by one state did not authorise another state to violate the 
Covenant# After having examined all the facts of the case# 
it was the opinion of the Committee of Six that the Italian 
Government had **resorted to war in disregard of its cove­
nants under Article 12 of tho Covenant of Ihe League of 
Nations#*’
In the vote in tho Council for the adoption of the 
committee^ a report, only Italy voted against# but because 
she was a party to the dispute, the report’s unanimous ac­
ceptance was not affected# The Council then referred the
^^For full text of these Articles# ace 
pp# 122-23.
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report of the Committee of Six to the Asseiably^ which wag 
to be in aeesion on October 9# two days after the report 
was accepted by the Council* During this interval of time# 
the President of the Council urged the members to do all 
they could to acquaint the delegates in the Assembly with 
the great task that the League was undertaking»
Once again interest turned to the Assembly, where 
the recommendations of the Council would be accepted or re­
jected# As the session opened, Edward Bonos, the Presi­
dent of the Assembly, urged all the members to male© known 
their feelings# The Covenant had left it up to each indi­
vidual member to determine whether or not Article 16 would 
become binding, and the general support of all nations was 
needed if the League were to be successful# &uoh debate 
would go a long way ih aligning public opinion and assur­
ing each inember thftt it would be sharing in the burden of 
applying Banctions#
In the three days of debate, fifty of the member 
nations expressed cheir intention of applying the provisions 
of Article 16# Three nations--Au3tria, Hungary, and Alba­
nia— indicated that they would be unable to enforce sanc­
tions because of friendship and economic ties with Italy, 
and Switzerland deblared her neutrality#
These dissensions did not greatly detract from the
5h
Bioral effect of the verdict, but, due to the unanimity rule 
In the League of Nations, these nations could have stopped 
the application of sanctions had their use been put forth 
In the form of p resolution, ïo circumvent this possible 
obstaclet Bones pointed out that the matter of sanctions 
was for individual members to decide. But to facilitate 
the implementation of sanctions against Italy by those who 
desired to do so, the members were invited to set up a co^ 
ordinatlng committee thr't would function to aid their ef­
forts.
Thus, by October 11, 1935 the morabora of tho League 
had made the décision to use the League of Nations for the 
purpose for which it wss intended* It had finally taken 
to heart the urgent ple^diiigü from one of its members, 
Kthlopia, At last Article 15 of the Covenant had been in­
voked, but only after a long costly delay, bec’iuse Italy 
was able to execute the invasion before any settlement was 
reached.
The military Invasion greatly complicated the 
League*» task, for favorable Italian prospects for conquest 
made Mussolini less interested in coiiclliatlon. The members 
were forced now to take the extreme steps of applying sanc­
tions against Italy In honoring their obligations arising 
from Article 16, The great experiment was now in its 
Initial stpge. The world*s attention was turned to the
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activities in the Co-ordinating Committee, where the exper- 
Inent was being defined and sot up*
While some were doubtful of success, others Insist-» 
od that there could be no other result if the League was to 
survive# and, to achieve that end, the cooperation of all 
meiabera would be necessary. But the speeches of September 
in the Assembly had seemed to assure this, <nd the decision 
to set up the machinery to enforce the necessary measures 
against Italy was made with no serious misgivings, Dlsillu- 
sionment was yet to come#
C!îAPTEH III 
C0!ZFID2VCE Al̂ D SAKCTJ0N3
The création of the Coiœaittee of Go-ordlDatlon as 
the body to deal with tho application of sanctions agslnat 
Italy was a tacit acknowledgment that the constitutional 
limitations in the Covenant precluded using the existing 
organs of the League to deal with Italy# Because of the 
unanimity rule in both the Assembly and the Council» action 
could easily have been blocked. But by viewing the entire 
sanctions issue as being a problem for the members to deal 
with collectively, and not as actions of the League per se# 
any powers wishing to uphold Article 16 could act regard** 
less of Italy.
Bridging the constitutional question, nevertheless, 
left the moat important issue unanswered. Would the members 
of the League of Katlons be united enough in purpose and 
exorcise the necessary moral courage to deal with one of 
the larger powers in the organisation? Although their past 
record had been unimpressive, this time there seemed to be 
strong sentiment for successful united action. Hoare and 
Laval had given the support of their governments to the 
undertaking, and the tone of the speeches in the Assembly
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In September had shown other governments to be equally 
anxious for tho League to honor the principles of the Cove­
nant* This had done a good deal to create a feeling of 
confidence as the task of applying sanctions was be.;̂ un*
In reality, th League w&a attempting to do two
things at once during the next few months8 to deal with one
of the large powers and to try out tho weapon of économie
sanctions. The latter was the first attempt at collective 
action of a non-military nature égslnst one of its members 
branded as an aggressor* It was uncoiamcn for nations to 
adopt measures that might impair their own economic well­
being in defense of another political entity that was in­
significant in world politics* Litvinoff* s warning was 
finally being heeded,^ and the fear that unchecked aggres­
sion in Africa would encourage it in Kurope was enough to 
force the League to go to Ethiopia* s side*
The consequences of this fear manifested themselves 
in strange ways* France was now placed In a dileinna* Dhe 
found herself faced with tho necessity of reconciling her 
allegienoe to the Covenant with her desire to keeo Italy 
In her cf«mp* To whet extent could she cooperate in sanc­
tions before alienating Italy* and to what degree could she
^dupra* p* 31.
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let the League fail this tiïüef She might want to use it 
in Europe under si&iil&r circuiastsnoeSji and b serious de­
feat now would make It useless later*
The answer was sefn in the emasculated sar..cttcns 
that were finally decide upon* ^.rticle 16 called for the 
severance of trade and financiJ^l relations, prohibition of 
Intercourse with the nationals of the Covenant-breaking 
state, the possible us® of arma against the aggressor, and 
tho further possibility of his being expelled from the 
League* The sanctions that were put into effect, in con­
trast, were more annoying then they were hax'mful to Italy, 
for she was still able to execute the war successfully.
The double objectives of keeping Italy placated and 
at thef same time enforcing Article 16 could not both be 
fulfilled. The eventual del%at of Ethiopia was fores' ad- 
owed in 1935 by the politiosil machinations thut overpowered 
the will to carry out the Covenant. Political hypocrisy 
contributed to her defeat equally as much as military re­
versals.
To understand more easily the procedure followed by
the Co-ordination Committee, the resolutions passed by the
2Assembly in 1921 should be considered. The Covenant had
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envisaged a universal organisation, but with tho abaonce 
of such powers as the United States, Russia, and Gennany, 
members became alars'aod over the conséquences of a strict 
interpretation of Article 16, How could they, as members 
of the League, apply any effecwiv© sanctions whon an ag­
gressor could easily turn to the markets of these non-^mem- 
borat The resolutions of 1921 were Intended to supplement 
the Covenant when the League was noting under Article 16, 
The Council was to be given a supervisory role for the en­
tire procedures necessary to impose the a emotions called 
for in the entire article, not just those of a military 
nature. It could be assisted by a tochnical coD&iittee in 
the task of co-ordinating tho efforts of the entire member* 
ship,
A second significant idea embodied in the resolu­
tions of 1921 was that of tho graduated economic and fin­
ancial sanctions. Resolution ll| state 2 that, if the appli­
cation of ©conomle pressure were prolonged, meaiflures of in­
creasing stringency might be telcen. The most severe was 
the cutting off of the food supply of the civilian popu­
lation, a measure of last resort to be taken only when all 
other measures had failed. This implied that the enforce­
ment of sanctions was to be a graduated process, rather 
than an abrupt and definite severance of all relations*
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Even though these resolutions were never ratified 
by the members# their Influence can be seen in the type of 
sanctions that were applied against Italy* The character 
of the sanctions and their application were not the same as 
was called for %n Article 16 which stipulated the immediate 
severance of all trade and financial relations#
The resolution of the Assembly inviting members of 
the League to constitute a co-ordination committee, which 
was the first step t«ken to Implement sanctions, readsi 
The Assembly
Having tiikeu cogniaanoo of the opinions ©zprcsaod by 
the members of the Council »t the Council*» meeting on 
October 7# 1935;
Taking Into eonsiderstion the obligation» which rest 
upon the Members of the League in virtue of Article 16 
of the Covenant and the desirability of co-ordination of 
the measures which they may severally contemplate;
Recommends that the Members of the League, other thah 
the parties, should set up a committee, composed of one 
delegate, assisted by exports, for each Member, to con­
sider and facilitate the co-ordination of such measure» 
and, if necessary, draw the attention of the Council or 
the Assembly to the situations requiring to be examined 
by them.
Just what was the nature of the committee thet had 
been set up? The President of the Aasembly, Benes> said that 
It was neither an Assembly nor a Couhcll organ, but a **con­
ference of States Members meeting to consult together with 
a view to the application of Article 16, ̂*3 Alolsi raised 
numerous objections to Its existence. If it was not an
13d, pp. 113-115-.
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organ of the League« he contended that the governiaenta were 
taking independent action through it, which waa not only a 
violation of the Covenant# but also contributed to an at* 
moaphere of unrest which was a denger to European peace#^
In spite of the Italian objections to the operation 
of the Co-'Ordinating Committee# the Assembly never did at­
tempt to define Its legal status# In the absence of such 
a definitive decision, one m?ghfe say that it possessed the 
status of an organ of the League of Nations as it was set 
up by the members of the Lesgue of Nations in order to 
carry out their obligations under the Covenant#5
The power Of this committee, or conference as it 
might be called, was fixed by the Assembly resolution of 
October 10* According to it the Co-ordination Committee 
waa to ^consider and facilitate" the co-ordination of meas­
ures under Article 16 and, where necessary, "to draw the 
attention of the Council or the Assembly to situations re­
quiring to be exajmincd by them*" ‘These terms were amply 
broad to permit diverse technical studies being made* The 
only question which might arise under them waa that of the
^L.K.O.J.S.S. ISO, pp. 336-37.
^Albert Urn Highlay, The Acitons of the States Mem- 
bers of the Lear?ie of Nacions in /Application of Sanctions 
Against It^ly, 19357i93ô* Doctoral Dissertation, University 
of Creneva^COeneva : Journal de Cronevn, 1938), p* 91#
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nature of the action taken by It. In thla respect It was 
made clear on numerous oocasiona that only recommendatlona 
were possible. Ko blading decisions could be talien.^
To make its task easier# the committee used a sys* 
tern of subcommittees throughout the entire sanctions issue. 
The Co-ordination Committee remained the final judge on any- 
proposed actions# but it delegated the main responsibility 
for determining action to the Committee of Eighteen# In­
stead of having to operate within a committee of fifty four 
members# the primary decisions were made In thla smaller 
body#
The Committee of Eighteen in turn appointed various 
other subcommittees to aid it in Its work# These subcom­
mittees wore of two typesî the one was concerned with the 
preparation of proposal# and the other dealt with complex 
technical problems. There wore five subcommittees of the 
first type# These were (1) a drafting committee for Pro­
posal I# (2) a Military Suboommittoe# (3) a Financial Sub­
committee# (i|.) an Economic Subcoxmrdttee# and (5) a Mutual 
Support Subcommittee# These were responsible for the five 
proposal# that were eventually passed by the Co-ordination
Cf.# E.H»0,y.S .S# llih*. p. 33# M* de Madariaga# 
Spain# and I,kTq # lli67 p. 53# M, Stuck!# Switzerland.
63
Committee# The auheomrnltteea of the second type were also 
five in number# These wore the (1) Economic Committee>
(2) the IfCgal Committee# (3) the Clearing Agreements Coro- 
mitteej (l|,) the Contracts Committee and (S) the Petroleum 
Experts Comittee# The nature of the work of these oommlt-» 
toes is indicated bj their titles*^ Membership on any of 
these committees was doterolned by the particular interests 
of the various members end geographical location#^
With these general considerations in mind, the work 
of the Co-ordination Committee can be examined# At Its 
first meeting on October 11, Auguste de Vasconcellos of 
Portugal was elected Chairman# The Gooaaittee of Eighteen 
was established to carry out the main work, leaving the 
Co'^ordinatlon Committee to pass on the final recommend a-* 
tions#
At the first meeting of the Committee of Eighteen 
on the same day, the first steps were taken* % e  members 
decided that an arms embargo was the most urgent require^ 
ment, and Eden, the British representative, and Coulondre, 
the French representative, drew up Proposal based on
Taighley, pp# 
p. 95,
^Pop I'ull text, seo Api^endlx, pp. 128-29.
the îteias Included In the United States embargo already In 
force* Proposal I called for the limedlate lifting of the 
existing embargoes on arms shipments to Ethiopia that Indl-** 
vidual countries might have passed, and an imposition of an 
embargo on such shipments to Italy* These measures were to 
apply to any contracts in the process of execution* The 
members were further requested to prevent any such ship-» 
ment8 that might reach Italy Indirectly*
At the aecond meeting of the Co-^ordir^atlon Commit-» 
tee on the eleventh# Proposal I was put to vote* Hungary 
abstained, and Switzerland and Luxembourg refused to vio­
late their neutrality by allowing arms shipments to Ethiopia* 
The rapidity with Which this proposal was passed 
is interesting* All this had been done in the first day, 
and it is worthy of emphasis In view of the fact that the 
practice in the case of later proposals was less ideal* On 
the other hand# it Is to be noted that this first measure 
did not have unanimity# in view of the decisions of Hungary# 
Switzerland, and Luxembourg*
Other actions taken In the first meeting of the 
Committee of Eighteen included the appointment of the Fin­
ancial and Military Subcommittees*. The former was to pre­
pare A Study of financial sanctionsand the latter was to 
complete the list of arms to be Included under Proposal I*
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At It» meéting on Ootol>®r 12| the Co-^ordlnation 
CoOTuittee* realls&ing that the ability of states to Impose 
sanctions depended on the passage of appropiate legisla-» 
tlon# decided on the policy of setting a future date when 
each measure would become effective» Thla would allow 
those countries in question the necessary time to enact any 
necessary legislation» Thougÿa the members had accepted 
their obligations under the Covenant, many had not bothered 
to provide the necessary laws to carry them out#
In another procedural decision the committee de«
elded against communicating its activities to non^members*
It concluded that in order to avoid provoking unfavorable 
opinions, the committee would not take this action until it 
had a complete plan worked out that could be put into opera^ 
tion. Thus any controversy would be threshed out by the 
committoe alone
On the same day, the Committee of Eighteen began
Its considération of economic measures to be taken against
Italy# Eden suggested that the simplest step would be for 
the members to cut off all Imports from Italy# If this 
were done, seventy per cent of Itmly*s export trade would 
be affected# Such a reduction would cause a strain on her
lOLiM.Q.J.S.S. p. 36.
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economy» Since haate waa Important^ tbla would constitute 
ttoxne action that could he impcaed through existing customs 
regulations^ while the problem of stopping exports of cer­
tain items to Italy was being conaldered»^^
But the French delegate# Coulondre# took an oppo­
site stand# He wanted the procedure reversed# first an
embargo on exports to Italy# and then the trade strangu- 
12latlon* There arose considerable haggling in the commit­
tee over this split# which really went to the heart of the 
problem* Just what would be the nature of th© sanctions? 
Hot ta of Switzerland summed up the controversy when he 
said that the sanctions should be as effective as possible# 
but if the members hoped that the dispute could be settled 
by conciliation# then the measures should not be irritat­
ing to Italy
Eden replied that Kotta waa perhaps correct# but 
that he felt the measures would be less irritating if they 
were immediately# rather th#m graduailly# effective* Hop­
ing to keep his proposal from having to go to a subcommit­
tee# Eden contended that the Committee of Eighteen could
^4bld.. p. 37, 
p. 37,
p. li,2.
67
easily decide the Issue# the Co-ordination Committee could 
pass It# and it could be put into effect before the French 
proposal ever left the present body#^^
This impaase resulted in an adjoument until Octo­
ber 111» Before returning to the controversy over the eco­
nomic sanctions# the Oosmlttee of Eighteen acted on the 
proposal submitted by the Financial Subcommittee# which 
was amended and sent on to the Co-ordination OoBmittee#
The latter body passed the financial sanction# or Proposal 
II# later the same day*^^
This second sanction stipulated that all loans to 
the Italian Government were to cease# as well all banking 
and other credits* Ito loans were to be made to or for any 
public authority# person# or corporation in Italy or her 
territories# The governments enforcing this financial 
sanction were to take wh»t steps they could under existing 
legislation and were to pass any further laws needed so 
that Proposal II could be put into effect by the last day 
of October»
After disposing of Proposal II# the Cousmittee of 
Eighteen returned to the discussion of economic sanctions*
% b t a . .  p, U2,
^% b l d .. pp* 52» 16, For full text seo Arrondlx,
pp. 130-31.
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Coulondre*» motion to e«t up e aubcommittee to deal with
both the French and Britieh euggestlons won the dmy, although
Eden never ceased Insisting that a subeommlttee study waa
unnecessary for cutting off Imports from Itnly» With the
under»tending that his proposal would go Into effect in any
ease by October 13, Eden conceded his point to the French*
The Committee of Eighteen, through the Go*»ordination
Comltte®, made certain efforts to facilitate the execution
of the provisions for mutual support called for in para*»
graph 3 of Article 16* In order to minimise loss and in*#
convenience when acting under Article 16, the members had
agreed to "mutually support one another#" These provisions
were a device to equalise the burden as much as possible
and a reassurance tĥ it the entire momberstiip would eolloc*»
tlvely resist any threats aimed at them by an aggressor*
As a draft proposal, but not a proposal per se, both com*»
mlttees passed statements reaffirming the idea embodied in 
16paragraph 3* The Committee of Eighteen established a 
suboommltteo the same day to prepare a fonoial draft on 
mutual support, but it was felt that some statement on the 
subject should bo made right away# This would minimize the 
fear of some nations that they might bear more than their
pp. 15, ,5li.
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shftre of tho burden*
Tho next action to be taken was on October 16 on 
the reooïîBnendatlônô of the military and legal subooi»alttees# 
To make sure that the list of a m s  placed under embargo 
would be complete^ the Military Subcommittee had been formed* 
On October 15 it reported on the items It felt should bé in-» 
eluded under Proposal I# The Committee of Eighteen passed 
the recommendations on to the Co*»ordinisttlon Cormittec in the 
form of Proposal I A* which was put Into Immediate effect 
The other action wms acceptance of a legal resolution which 
called upon the states to »iake possible any required legis­
lation to fulfill the obligations under Article l6«^®
Three days later^ the Subcomittee on Economic 
Measures rendered its report, with draft proposals on the 
prohibition of importing goods from Italy and the export­
ing of certain others to Italy* The Subcommittee on Mutual 
Support submitted its recommendations for that purpose also* 
In the Committee of Eighteen disagreement arose over tho sug­
gested dates when the economic sanctions should bccomo of-* 
fective* Eden wanted the members to determine this by no 
later than October 31* He finally won his point# The
^^Xbid,, p, 63* See Appendix, yp. 128-29.
^%bld.. p. 60.
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Comraifcte© deleted a paragraph from the Mutual Support recom^ 
mendatIon that would have discouraged trade with members 
or non-members wîxo refused to carry out the proposals de^ 
signed to stop the Italian aggression. The Committee made 
this decision because It felt that the terms which had es-» 
tabllshed Its jurisdiction would not sllow such a recoramon- 
dation. It would in effect be a punitive action» and ohly 
the Council or the Assembly could act in such a case.
After this limited debate, Proposal III, the embar­
go on receiving Italian imports, Proposal IV, the embargo 
on the exporting of certain items not included under Pro­
posal I to Italy, and Proposal V, the provisions for mutual 
support, were passed by the Co-ordinatlcn CoaHnittee#^^
The first of those made illegal all imports from 
Italy other than silver or gold. Exceptions to this gen­
eral rule were (1) articles Jjmported from Italy to which 
processing added more than 2$ per cent to their value,
(2} goods already en route at the time of the effective date 
of the enforcement, and (3) the personal belongings of trav­
elers from Itf»ly, The members were to notify the Oomtalttee 
of Co-ordination by October 28 when they could put these 
sanctions into force*
pp, 20, 2L-25, For full text of these 
proposals see Appendix, pp, 131-35*
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Proposal IV addad boasts of burden and certain min- 
ersla to Proposal I* Oovermients were to insure that the 
Items contslned under this sanction would not be allowed 
to reach Italy through Indirect routes or rd**exportatlon.
ÏÎO goods were to be exempted from this embargo except those 
already era route. The effective date of this proposal was 
to bo deteriolned by the Co-ordination Committee on October 
31.
Proposal V was a detailed reiteration of the earlier 
draft resolution made In the t»ro committees on mutual 
port# It was an attempt to increase the trade between the 
states enforcing sanctions In order to offset the loss of 
Italian markets# as well as to add stimulus for enforce­
ment# Under its terms# the Committee of Eighteen was to 
function as an assistance body to consider particular prob­
lems of individual states in bringing the second part of 
the proposal Into operation#
Before closing the first session of the Co-ordina­
tion Committee on October 19# two more resolutions were 
passed# Bince sanctions were being handled through an un­
official organ of the League of Hatlona, the Committee of 
Eighteen was instructed to remain la being# This was prob­
ably done to maintain a facade of authority and encourage­
ment, though as much was nCit admitted* The Co-ordination
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Committee also decided that the time had come to notify the 
non-mciabers officially of the proposed action against Italy# 
The decision was made to communicate to these governments 
the reeoîîMended sanctions^ pertinent documents relating to 
the entire dispute, the October 7 minutes of the Council^ 
and the October 9-11 minutes of the Assembly* These were 
the minutes of che meetings that had declared Italy to be 
an aggressor and that hsd made the decision to apply sane-* 
tionSf respectively# In polite words* all non-member gov­
ernments were invited to notify the committee of any actions 
they might be taking under the circumstances#^^
The fifty two members of the Co-ordination Committee 
then adjourned*'and with some feeling of satisfaction#
Within less then two weeks they had been able to agree on 
five proposals which they hoped would cause Italy to capit­
ulate# But any feeling of self-congratulation should have 
been accompanied by oome pangs of conscience# Ifotvri the tend­
ing the feeling on the part of the members that rapid action 
had been taken, the action could hîi've been taken even more 
quickly# The French maneuvers to delay adoption of Propo­
sals III and IV were an indication of unnecessary delays#
The very nature of the proposals calls forth another charge
^^Ibid#, p# 27# See Appendix# pp. 13&-37.
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that praise should be used with discretion* When the pro­
visions of Article 16 are compared with the decisions tsken, 
the Inadequacy of the cosnmitte©*s work is |;laring# There 
was never any consideration in these debates of any mill-* 
tar y action on the part of the jsembers, and only the dele­
gate froRL South Africa# and then only once* had the courage 
to suggest a diplomatic rupture with Italy* This was in 
the first meeting of the Comlttee^of Eighteen* but the ob­
vious silence which greeted his suggestion quickly encour­
aged him to forget It*^^
An analysis of the measures that were adopted shows 
that the spirit of complete severance of ooîîsmeroial inter­
course was deliberately Ignored* The attempt to cripple 
Mussolini*a war potential was a ludicrous one, for there 
was no prohibition on fuel items nor on two of war* s most 
necessary commodities, steel and iron ore* While a later 
attempt was made to include these basic items, the Commit­
tee would have done well to consider these potentials in its 
first session* If Eden was correct in stating that final 
effeotiveneas depended on immediate effectiveness, the ad- 
jouriment was premature*
X/ltvinoff alone spoke out against the feeling of
Zllbld.. p. 20.
n
8uoee08« Hq charged that the sioaaurca had not resulted from
an exhaustive attempt hj the committee to take all the xueas-
urea It could to atop Italy*. Ho warned the members that
the action® taken thus far against Italy should not be con^
sldared an adequate precedent for applying Article 16 in
future cases* He deplored the hesitancy of some states to
adopt the proposed me«sures because of friendship* economic
ties* and kinship— ^reasons put forth by Hungary* Austria*
and Switzerland* He felt th^t success lay anly In the sot
of universal acknowledgment of obligations* and that univer-^
22sality was not present*
But on the other hand was this first session po un-*- 
suocessful? It is true that the measures taken were not
sufficiently drastic to nieet the needs of the hour* but at
least some attempt was made. It was unfortunate that more 
comprehensive measures were not taken ©t the time when the 
majority of the members were receptive to the idea of aanc^
tions* but* on the other band, perhaps as much was obtained
as was possible* While the futile hope for cone ill ?»t Ion had 
not seised most of the momocrs yet in October* Prance was 
still able to limit the sreope of the sanctions from the very 
first* Lack of universal support may have influenced the
p. 27.
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declalon to limit the aanotlona, ernd, since collective ce- 
curlty per ae has never been realised universally* the ac­
tion may represent the mo?t practical optimum that was 
possible* Had the members of the League later continued 
in the same direction they had originally taken on October 
11* when the decision was mad© to apply Article 16* per­
haps there still would have been time to coerce Italy* Un­
fortunately the original spirit degenerated Into political 
opportunism in the last raonthn of 1935# and positive ac­
tions reverted into meaningless motions*
There is acme defense* however, the first place* 
the member© had no precedent to follow* and the mere fact 
that they were able to come together and agree on even 
partial measure© was a step forward* Secondly* the tech­
nical machinery which was set up to carry forward the mem­
bers* decisions proved to be workable# There was nothing 
to indicate that sanctions would not be a feasible method 
to halt Italy*
Prom the closing of the first session of the Co­
ordination Committee on October 19 until sanctions were 
lifted in July of the following year* no further embargoes 
were adopted# The second session of this body lasted only 
three days# from October 31 until November 2# It did not 
meet again until July 6* when it reconmended th>?t sanctions 
be lifted*
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During Its eecond session, a report waô given by 
the Chalr%R&n on the co cep tance of the proposals by the gov*» 
eminent a of the world# Proposal 1$ the aras ejobargo, had 
been accepted by fifty governments, who had or would soon 
put it Into effect. Forty nine governments were ready to 
put Proposal II, the financial embargo. Into effect; forty 
eight favorable replies had been received on Proposals III 
and IŸ, the economic embargoes; and thirty nine governments 
had accepted the principle of Proposal V which contained 
the provisions for mutual apport. Because of the slow eom- 
munloation facilities to some areps, this was nob consld** 
ered a complete
On the basis of these replies, the Committee of 
Eighteen recommended that the effective dates of epplicà»* 
tlon for Proposals II, III, and IV should be November 15, 
1935# Althou^ÿ) the delay would be of great benefit to 
Italy, the Ooimittee of Eighteen felt that the additional 
time was needed to allow states to provide for enforcing 
legislation.^^ If the members were anxious to proceed with 
the enforcement of the sanctions, it seems there was no 
reason to excuse such a long delay for want of national
1Ij6, p. 7.
p, 8.
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authority# Why could not the enforcement have been placed 
on an ’’aa-Boon-aa'-poaslble’ arrangement? The Co-ordination 
CoKaalttee accepted the recommended date.
Two very interesting speeches wore mad© before the 
members of the Co-ordination Committee on Kovember 2* The 
first was made by Î avalî  who reiterated France*a intentions 
of carrying out the obligations of the Covenant^ but, remi­
niscent of tho speech he had made before the Assonbly on 
September 13, he once again emphasized the inpox’tano© of 
**concillation and peaceful settlement»** Because he had 
such great faith that such a settlement could be found# he 
informed his listeners th^t Franc© and Great Britain would 
continue to try to find a basis for negotiation#^^
Hoar© followed Laval and told the members th^t he 
regretted that such steps had had to be taken against Italy# 
but that no other course seemed possible. He Informed the 
oomaitt©© that certain discussions had been going on be­
tween France, Great Britain, and Italy, but only of a ten-** 
tative nature# He went on to assure his listeners that 
nothing was going to be done behind the League's back, and 
that any suggestions would have to be agree(?ble to both the 
League of Nations and the two parties concerned,^
^%bl<3.. »J. S. 
^hbid.. p. 9.
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with these statements, the sanction pover$ were 
first Inforiued of the Impending Hoare-Laval rlan* Once the 
terms of the plan wore made public, the determination to 
maintain and Increase sanctions against Italy began to 
wane# With these pronouncements of high political offi­
cials from the two leading powers In the LeAgue, the time 
was not far away when indecision would rule.
After Ho are and Lavnl had finished, v>?n Zeeland,
the Prime Minister of Bel^^ium, rose to applaud the an- 
27nouncement* Ho expressed his hope that the committee 
would give to Hoare and Laval its official mandate to do 
what they could to end the war# But the Committee of 
Eighteen was not an official organ of the League, and had 
been set up for the sole purpose of dealing with sanctions. 
It could not therefore grant such a license. The coîïimit- 
tee did not vote on the suggestion, and passed over van 
Zeeland*s request with the Chairman stating thmt the mem­
bers gave the efforts their approval.
This expression of hop® that ah equitable settle­
ment could be reached outside of the League was taken, by 
Laval and Hoare to be a mandate, whether that was the com­
mittee* s real intention or not* It was not long before
^^Welters believes van Zeeland*» actions were 
according to plan, Walters, p# 661|,
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these two bad made the second attempt to reach an extra* 
League settlement while the dispute was still under the 
Leaguers consideration* The fact that Kussolini had scoffed 
et the proposals made to him on the occasion of the first 
try did not bother Hoare and Laval* They were ready to 
risk another attempt In hop# that the League would not have 
to commit Itself to a policy of stronger sanctions*
Returning to the work of Implementing the enforce­
ment of sanctions^ two more resolutions were passed by the 
Co-ordination Committee on November 2#^^ With reference 
to Proposal III# the committee decided that any contracts 
that had been paid In full by October 19 would not be af­
fected by the November 19 date# and that debts owed to mem­
bers by Italy would remain valid* Also# any countries that 
experienced extreme hardship due to Italian non-payment of 
debts would be compensated for such losses through the
Mutual Support arrangement,a In Article 16.
Although the Oo-ordlnation Committee adjourned on 
the second# the Committee of Eighteen remained in session 
until November 6* It passed amendments during this time 
to all of the embargoes except that on arms* To manage the
financial embargo more easily, Lropos&l IX A was agreed on.
•At. 1L6, pp. ÎI.6-50* For full texbs see 
Appendix, pp. 138-39.
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The sanctions statds wera to accept iiq new Italian lira in 
the clearing accounta in the countries exporting items to 
Italy for payment. In or^îer to assure that Itily would 
have to make payment on goods she had iijqpoi’ted, the pur­
chase price paid for Italian goods was placed in a clearing 
account from which payment would be made on debte owed by 
Italy* The amendment to the embargo on receiving Itall«?,n 
goods excepted certain items, borne of these included bookS| 
newspapers# periodicals# maps# and printed music*
Host significant; of the amendment;s was Proposal 
IV A* Walter Riddell# the Canadian representative# asked 
that the list of Items under Proposal IV be expanded to In­
clude more oommoditlea* He ventured to speak for tho en­
tire committee when he said all knew that the present llGt 
was not as comprehensive as it should be# particular!',^ be­
cause there was no restriction on iron ore# coal# steel or 
petroleum products* He proposed that# sine,» the Conmittee 
of Eighteen was charged with making reoonmiendations to the 
various governments# it could well consider placing these 
items under embargo. After examining the possibility# 
Riddell concluded by saying that the coMlttee could put 
such embargoes into effect when it felt they would be suc­
cessful*^^
29Ibid.# p. 33*
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Th9 DuboowltW e th«>
o« tb$ w$^%ing tW Ooimltt## of
pA$»0d f'jroi'?oaail IV A# wt)leh in
AUgg$&tlù%* Uow#V4^r# A w&A ït© ln 4 1 e « itiô n  wh#%% th#
po#%l would Woome The wrdlr^s etlpulmwd th«t
the nec»R8#$^ oondltlof&e would h^ve to be M el  1 mod# but no 
condition# were 11# tod « The oordltiooe In the mlnde of 
the ôcœdttee î^emoer» were f^robebly theee»^^ %hea would
the $%m;bera who fumlebed a eubetentiel ehere of tho#e 
Itoise be m^ee&ble to euoh e proĵ o«#i'i To whet oKtemt 
would Greet Orlt&ln and Frenee eu;port the enforoeiwnt of 
eucb meeeuM#? Theee were no email ^^robleme» and the ŝ oeei« 
billti of den;^ing theee baele Iteme to eroueed eonaid-*
ereble interest >&n4 ooiftrover#y 1^ end out of the League#
It is little wonder th%t the Coea&lttee of Elî^uoen felt It 
had done ell it could for «»ae Miuent#
Conclttdlnigj ite%# of buetress for the es>mlttee In 
this session were the adoption of froposel IV S end a reso^ 
lotion on excepting co^^tmots that ceme after the October 
19 deadline# The fcmer called on the members to deter* 
mine the final destination of sXl good® exported i^ioh were 
restricted h/ Proposal IV# In the evsDt of an
^^Tojnbee, pp* 27S^7^»
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Increase to neutrals« they were to make sure that Italy was 
not receiving some portion of them via indirect routes*
The last resolution permitted the execution of any contracts 
made to buy Italian goods# if these goods were of essential 
importance to the Importing state# or If not less than 20 
per cent of the total sums due were paid b/ October 19^
It can be seen from the general nature of the pro-* 
posais and recommendations agreed upon In the second session 
of the conanittee that the Initial momentum was slowing down* 
Aside from the pending threats of Proposal IV A, Italy* a 
position was no worse than it had been at the end of the 
first session* Most of che recent measures were aimed pri-* 
mar11y at lessening the discomforts of states applying 
sanctions* Certainly the delay until November l8, before 
the economic sanctions would take effect# was a break for 
Italy# Since the resolutions passed in this session dealt 
mostly with Imports, Italy had until the time of the effec­
tive date a good opportunity to ley in a future supply of 
the items that would then be affected. Though Italy*s 
future was dark, it was by no meana desperate.
The first Itelimn reply to the sanctions came on
November 11 In a strongly worded protest to all the members
31applying sanotlons*"^ She again charged the members with
3^Documents on International Affairs* 1935# P* 216*
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falling to appraclat® tho service Italy was render*
Ing mankind In bringing olvlliaatlon to JEthlopla* The 
massee there were greeting Italien troops as their liber* 
atorSf slaves were being freed, and the people of Ethiopia 
were placing such faith in Italy that it had now become her 
great duty to continue the great civilising service she had 
begun. After this modest assertion, Italy claimed that aaxic* 
tions were illegal# Italy had not been accorded her righta 
under the Covenant, because no vote to impose sanctions had 
ever been taken in an official League organ# In applying 
sanctions, the members were acting in an unjust and arbi­
trary manner#
She finished her protêtst with a threat of retalia­
tion# She warned that sanctions would be followed by coun­
ter-sanctions# She might have to alter the current rates 
of exchange, but, most important, the entire concept of 
sanctions and counter-sanetlona would have the effect of 
creating ill feelings that could lest long after enforce­
ment had ceased# Her closing threat intimated that, should 
the unjust policy be continued, Italy would have to consid­
er withdrawing from the League of Nations# By all of this, 
Italy acknowledged thf̂ t even the inadequate sanctions had 
some effect on her economy and public morale#
The Committee of Eighteen had not settled on a 
definite meeting date when it adjourned on November 6,
although It was understood that the next meeting would be 
held towards the end of November* In this interlude^ at­
tention was turned from the debates on sanctions to the
events outside of the league# In the first two months of
%
the war# Italy had not been able to achieve the rapid mili­
tary victory that she had anticipated# Because of the im­
pending rainy season in the timetable had to be
followed closely# and Mussolini was elready behind schedule« 
He was becoming uneasy over the prospects of strengthened 
sanctions and decided that he should invest In some insur­
ance* Laval seemed to be the best agent to deal with# so 
Mussolini moved some of his troops to the French border,
Talk was even spread around that the Riviera might be 
bombed* Walters even wonders if these maneuvers were not
taken at the suggestion of Lavsl so that the task of winning
32Great Britain* s support to his plan might be made easier, 
Laval was under a good deal of pressure to do Mussolini a 
service# and# since the oil embargo was the latter*a great­
est concern at the moment# except victory of course# Laval 
hit upon a plan that would bring something as good as vic­
tory# If accepted# Bven If this should not be the case# at 
least the oil embargo could be delayed for a while longer*
3^Walters# p, 667*
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When V^aeoneollos to eall % scooting of the
Ccnrnntttee of Eighteen for Bove%%ber 29 to eonelder the re- 
pile# opinion® of «.he .government® to the proposed addl^ 
tione in Proposal IV k$ Level csade en urgent request that 
the coi»lttoe*e meeting he delayed until December 12#
Keraly being In the poaition to refuse the wishes of the 
Eesd of the French Government# Yaseoncellos complied# thus 
Level delivered to Mussolini on one sccount# and he could 
now work out the preparations for the second delivery#
CHAfîEE IV 
THE LEAGUE LOSES ITS WILL
The faet that Laval had managed to have the sched­
uled meeting of the Committee of Eighteen postponed, the 
Increasing prominence given to a policy of conciliation, 
and the threats emanating from Rome combined to sound the 
death knell for any further extension of sanctionsè Inde­
cision had at last tsken precedence over the will to suc­
ceed# The final effort to coerce Italy was made on November 
6, 1935* when the Committee of Eighteen approved the prin­
ciple of the oil sanction* The League might yet win a few 
battles against Italy, but it had lost the will to gain 
victory,
Tho French and British Governments had decided to 
make another bilateral attempt to reconcile the disputants, 
and the outcome of the Paris negotiations early in December 
was the Hoare-Laval Flan,^ which was officially transmitted 
to the Governments of Italy and Ethiopia on December 11 and 
13* respeotlvely*
The Hoare-Laval flan oon&isted of two parts* By
^For full text see Appendix* pp* lLj.l-U3
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the first, it authorized an exchange of territories. Italy 
would have received In essence that territory which she had 
already conquered and occupied, and Ethiopia would have been 
compensated by receiving an outlet to the sem, preferably 
the Italian port of Asab in Eritrea, The second portion of 
the plan proposed the creation of a zone of economlo expan­
sion and settlement in Southern Ethiopia for the benefit of 
Italy* By the terms of the proposal, It«ly would heve been 
able to extend eventual political control over this portion 
of Ethiopia also. Italy would be acquiring this area under 
the pretense that ”tho beast of prey was not devouring his 
prey when he was devouring It**2
In the notifieetion of the plan that was sent to 
Italy, the two powers said they would tske tho necessary 
steps to submit the plan to the Comrûittea of Five In the 
event that the Italian Government accepted it as a basis 
for negotiation. Furthermore, ^in that ease the meeting 
of the Committee might modify the objéct of the meeting of 
the Committee of Eighteen which is fixed for the same day***3 
Thus the two governments held out the promise to Mussolini 
that if he should accept the plan, they would endeavor to
^Toynbee, p, 301,
3Highley, p, 202.
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prevent the Committee of Eighteen from Imposing the oil 
s&nctlon«
When the Conmlttee of Eighteen aseembledi on Deoem-* 
her 12, 193$# the Italian reply had not yet been received; 
After Laval and Eden had sunuaarlaed the British and French 
negotiations, Tytua KLomamlekl, the folish delegate to the 
coimnittee, outlined a series of arguments perfectly in ac­
cord with the Anglo**French communication to Kussolini, He 
asserted that the members of the Committee of Eighteen were 
obligated to use discretion pnd not take any action that 
might impinge upon the competence of the Council which 
would have to make a decision on the plan* The committee 
should do nothing to prejudice the political situation in 
which the Council would have to work in its efforts to re­
store peaceConsequently, on December 13, the chairman 
of the committee issued a statement which, with the tacit 
assent of ell but two of the members, declared that the 
Committee of Eighteen would not make any fresh decisions 
at that time for fear of prejudicing the progress of the 
negotiations in the Council*-^
' The Assembly was slap influenced by the desire to 
refrain from entering into the dispute just then* On
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December 12# before hie Government had received the text 
of the plan# the Ethiopian representative requested that 
tho Assembly be convened for a debate on the proposals#
The President of the Assembly# however# decided that It 
would be preferable for the Assembly to await the outcome 
of the debate In thé Council# Inasmuch as the Council was 
the organ to which the dispute had been originally sub­
mitted#^
The Council had received the plan on Deceinber 13# 
but was not called into session until December 13# Then 
It was called to consider the plan because the members of 
the Committee of Five# other thsn Eden and Laval# decided 
that the Committee was not competent to examine such pro­
posals# On the day that the Council met# Hoare resigned#
The disclosure of the terms of the plan had caused serious 
reverberations in Great Britain# and the Government had 
sacrificed Hoare* This# combined with the opposition of 
the Ethiopian Government# sealed the fate of the proposals# 
In any event# the Council decided to postpone any discussion 
until the two governments had made their official replies#
It thanked the authors of the plan and then instructed the 
Committee of Thirteen to re-exrmln® the entire situation#
p. 1̂ 2, J»n., 1936.
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^bearing In mind the provislona of tha C o v e n a n t . ^7
The avanta In tba Laagn© of Katlonsj from the an^ 
nouncement of the Hoere-Laval 1*1 an on the tenth to the 
close of the Council session on the eighteenth, were high* 
ly significant In the ibeague^s later actions In the dispute» 
The emphasis had now gone from sanctions to conciliation, 
a regretable alteration in the League * s policy. Did the 
Committee of Eighteen really have an obligation to refrain 
from extending the sanctions to oil, or was the presence 
of the Hoar©*Laval Bien an excuse to avoid angering Musso* 
llnl? Nothing In the Covenant would have prevented the 
Committee of Eighteen from following Its Initial policy of 
attempting to bring Italy Into line. There was no obliga­
tion in Article 16 to return to conciliatory attempts while 
sanctions were In effect| so, once the members had enforced 
sanctions, there was no legal reason for returning to con­
ciliation. The reversion waa ^nevertheless made, however 
unfortunate, and the consequence was an indefinite post­
ponement of the consideration of the oil embargo.
An Interim period* between December 19, 1935, and 
February 12, 1936, followed. There was an attempt by a 
representative of the Holy See to determine a basis for a
hbid.. p,
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sattleznent between Italy and Ethiopia, but the latter broke 
off these disouselona# In another effort to Initiate the 
Imposition of an oil embargo, the Ethiopian Government for«* 
warded a request to the Council on January 20 for its Imme­
diate application* Also Included was a request for flnan- 
clal assistance* The Committee of Thirteen reported to 
the Council on January 22 that no new opportunity had pre­
sented itself for a settlement of the dispute between the 
two partiest which opened the way for a new attempt to put 
an oil sanction in force. While Ethiopia received some 
consolation in this, her request for a loan was refused*^ 
The situation having changed at last, the Chairman 
of the Committee of Eighteen called © meeting for January 
22* The Chairman announced that the Committee would deal 
with several things, namely, a study of replies received 
from the governments that had sanctions in force and the 
consideration of Proposal IV A, the proposal that had been 
passed by the Committee to place an embargo on iron, steel, 
coal, and petroleum products. The Chairman stated that the 
conditions did not seem favorable for the application of 
sanctions to iron, steel, or coal, but that a committee of
Feb.. 1936, pp. 257-Q. 
9lt>ld.. p. 106,
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technical experte might he appointed to study the advlaa*^ 
billty of extending the emb&rgo to petroleum products.
The Committee of Eighteen then passed two resolu­
tion*^ The first celled for the Committee of Experts to 
make a study of tho effectlveneso of sanctions^ and the 
second set up the Committee of Experts on 011$^^
On February 1 the Conanittee of Experts submitted 
its report concerning the effectiveness of sanctions* The 
report noted that Proposal I* the arms embargo, had been 
accepted by fifty two goverrmients, fifty of which had en­
forced it % Proposal II, the atbargo on all loans or credits, 
had been accepted by fifty two governments, forty eight of 
which bad enforced it; Proposal III, the embargo on the 
importation of all goods from Italy, hsd been accepted by 
fifty governments, forty four of which h«d enforced It; 
Proposal IV, the embargo on exportation to Italy of certain 
items, had been accepted by fifty one governments, forty 
seven of which had enforced it; and Proposal V, the pro­
vision for mutual support, had been accepted by forty six 
governments* To determine the effectiveness of the sanctions,
the Committee of Experts decided to submit a questionalre 
to all govornsients of the world maintaining economic
lb-8, pp. 7-9,
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relations with
The Committee of Experts on Oil was o r g a n l a n d  
held its first meeting on February 3* It appointed frora 
Its members three subcommittee a to study the transports'» 
tlon problem# to determine Italian supply# and to Investi­
gate the consumption of petroleum products#
The task of the Committee of Experts on Oil was to 
study the influence such an embargo might have on Italy* s 
ability to meet her requirements for oil* The subcommit­
tees dealt with the problem from February 3 until tho time 
they reported on February 6* The result of these labors 
was a report th*.t consisted of a general summary and a 
statistical report to be used by the various governments 
should the sanction be imposed* The conclusions were 
briefly these: (1) Italy was capable of carrying two million 
tons with her own fleet; (2) Germany could augment this 
tonnage with another 500#000 tons and the United States 
200#000 tons; (3) therefore# if the members imposed a trans­
portation embargo# Italy could still cover her requirements* 
The methods of imposing an embargo were: (1) prohibit the 
sale of tankers to Italy and non-members of the Leegue; 
and (2) ask the members to prohibit their flag vessels from
Ibid,, p. 29.
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entering Italian porta* The general ooncluaion was that 
it would be very difficult to stop the oil supply to Italy# 
but that the embargo* If employed* would raise the coat of 
petroleum products to Italy a great deal*^^
The Couonittee of on Oil examliied the reports
of the subcoxranitteea from the sixth until the twelfth*
During this time a report was prepared for the Oonmittee 
of Eighteen and submitted on February 12# The report noted 
that Italian oil liq^orts had steadily Increesed since 1931» 
but that there was no reason to believe Italy was accui;iu- 
lating stocks prior to 1935# Consuna^tlon had probably 
equaled the total purchases# At that time Italy was con-* 
siderod to have a supply adequate for no longer than two 
months* and supplies en route would increase this amount 
to ft three month supply# With the exception of the United 
States* the members were Italy*» greatest source of retro** 
leuxa# It was not known what course the United States would 
follow in the event of such serction* but just limiting 
her exports to Italy to the pre-1935 level would make the 
embargo effective# Although Italy might use substitutes 
for petroleum* it would be difficult to assess this potential# 
To make an oil embargo absolutely effective, the non-member»
^^L«H.O.J,a.S. 1U8, p. 65.
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would have to comply with th* embargo# but with juat the 
members applying the sanction# the cost could be made pro­
hibitive# Should such an embargo be imposed# special care 
would have to be taken to prevent delivery by possible in­
direct, routes*^^ Instead of taking any action on the con­
clusions submitted by the oil experts# the Committee of 
Eighteen sent instructions to the experts to study further 
the methods of (tpplyl, g the sanction.
The Committee of Eighteen# however# never utilised 
the conclusions in this second study of the Committee of 
Experts on Oil* When the Committee of Eighteen met again 
on March 2 to consider the oil embargo# Etienne PIandin# 
the successor to Laval# suggested that# before any discus­
sion of Proposal XV A# the oil sanction, cam© up# a new 
attempt should be made by the Committee of Thirteen to ap­
peal to the belligerents to stop hostilities*^^ Eden said 
that his goverhment was ready to support the embargo on oil 
if other governments would agree# but# since the Committee 
of Eighteen still had to consider Proposal IV Â# ha had no 
objection to Fl&ndln^s suggestion*
Had the same spirit of the late months of 1935 still
^hbld.. p. 67.
ili9, p. 12
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animated the CoRsaalttee of eighteen, Flandln* a suggestion 
would have met with no eooej|,̂ tanoe, hut the sanctions st&tes 
had been too disillusioned by. recent events to oppose the 
French* Rather than increase the pressure on Italy to stop 
the hostilities* the decision was made to ask her to stop*
The Committee of Thirteen »iôt the next day* March 3* 
arid dispatched a telegram to the belligerents directing to 
them an urgent appeal to open negotiations limed lately with 
a view to ending the hostilities and restoring peace within 
the frm%ework of the League and the Covenant* For the first 
time since the war had begun* a definite deadline* March 10* 
was set for the replies
Ethiopia promptly accepted the appeal* "subject to 
the provisions of the Covenant being respected*" and ordered 
her Permanent Delegate to the League to be at the disposal 
of the Committee# But before the Italian reply had been 
received* there occurred the German military reoccupation 
of the Rhineland on March 7* an event'that made any oil 
embargo politically Impossible* France* above all* would 
never agree because of the disastrous effect such a step 
would have on rf*lations with Mussolini# The significance 
of the German action was soon felt* and the meeting of the
April, 1936, p. 395.
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Conaalttôe of Xhirteoxi which bad been scheduled for March 10 
waa postponed while the Council considered the Pranco-Gar^ 
%an situation# By this tlsia the divergence between France 
and Great Britain had become pronounced, and it was clear 
that the foraer could no longer be counted upon to support 
any increased pressure on Itely# Fronce deemed Mussolini 
friendship morn vital than over
The Committee of Thirteen met again on March 23# 
but no new decisions were made# There was no acknowledge 
Eient of either success or failure In the ourrenb program 
of conciliation# Failure would have removed any excuse 
for continued postponement of the oil sanction# and sue- 
cess was certainly not possible under the circumstances*
But something had to be done, so the Committee decided to 
return to the method the Council had used to conclude the 
Wal Wal arbitration by sending this time Madariaga# the 
chairman of i-he committee, to the t$o disputants# Eo was 
to attempt to miika the necessary arrangement to bring Itialy 
and ^Ethiopia together to work out a settlement within the 
provisions of the Covenant#^?
Once again Ethiopia expressed her willingness to
l%lghl*y, pp. 207-8.
April, 1936, p. 398,
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cooperate, and this time even the Itellane aeemed Interested* 
The Italian Government replied to the League on April 2 
that a delegate would be sent to Geneva to confer with 
Madariaga after Kaster* In addition, the reply proposed
iQthat he visit Rome for an exchange of ideas with Mussolini, 
The Committee of Thirteen met again on April 8 and decided 
that the League*s representative would not be sent to Rome 
until conversations had been held in Geneva with the Italian 
delegate* The League was not yet ready to make its trip to 
Canossa*
The outcome of the Geneva conversations revealed 
that the Italians were notwilling to work within the Cove­
nant to end the fighting# They would accept either an 
arndstlce or peace preliminaries as a means of ending the 
hostilities, but any negotiation would h«vo to be based on 
the present military situation* In addition, the Italians 
stated that only the method of direct negotiation would be 
acceptable, and, while the Committee of Thirteen would be 
*kept informed*^ of the progress. It would not have any 
official function In the negotiations, Ethiopia naturally 
refused to enter Into any talks under cheae terms and 
another Impasse e n s u e d , W i t h  the failure of this attempt
pp. 1486-67 
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ut conciliation^ the Committee of Thirteen a:\nounced on 
April 17 that Kadarlaga*» jniaalon had been fnlfllled and 
that the ci tu it ion vlth rCj^&rd to èdnelliatlon remained the 
came aa at the time of ite January 23rd report> i$e*# that 
the Council remained at the disposal of the parties for the 
continuance of the work of conciliation#
Eden interpreted the situation aa being an oppor­
tune time to extend the scope of the sanctions# and sug­
gested to the Council that it should take up such a con­
sideration* Edeut however# stood alone in the Council#
In contrast# the delegates of France# Russia# and Argen­
tina expressed their desire to intensify efforts toward 
conciliation and not further sanctions# The tone of their 
speeches Indicated that the concern over Germany’s inten­
tions was greater than their concern for Ethiopia# Paul- 
Bel cour# the French represent)» tire in the Assembly# said 
that# if the league was to meet the present threat in 
Europe# peace was needed in Ethiopia# and that Italy’s co­
operation would be necessary to a European settlement* 
Attitudes like this naturally did not favor a strengthened 
aanotions policy*
The final attempt made by the Council to end the
gOlbld«. p. 389,
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var waa In the form of a résolution that was passed on 
April 20#^ The resolution expressed regret that the last 
effort made by the Committee of Thirteen had not succeedodj 
but declared that the continuing of the war under condl* 
tlons contrary to the Covenant Involved the execution of 
obligations laid upon the members In such a case by the 
Covenant* A supreme appeal was made to Italy to bring the 
dispute to a close with the same spirit th&t the League of 
îTatlon» could expect from an original member and a perma-^ 
nent member of the Council# Italy^s answer was her mill'» 
t&ry victory.
The feeble optimism which inspired this appeal rap­
idly dwindled# Italian military success was gaining laoiaen- 
um# and on May 2 Halle Selassie was forced to flee* Addis 
Ababa fell four days later# and on Kay 9 Mussolini announced 
that the war was over# An Italian royal decree of the same 
day placed Ethiopia under Italian sovereignty* On Kay 10 
Halle S-elassie informed the Secretary-General from Jerusalem 
that Ethiopia would no lorger resist the Itellan armies# 
and that the decision had been amde to put an end to the 
"most sweeping# the most unjust m d  the moat Inhuman war of 
modem times
p. 393.
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The Council root In its rcgul&i* spring session on 
May 11 confronted with the fait accompli» Aloisl addressed 
the Council in the opening meeting, steting that, since a 
state of Ethiopia no longer existed, there was no point in 
keeping the dispute on its agenda. He even suggested that 
the Council should not seat the Ethiopian representative. 
This action the Council would not take end Alois! withdrew. 
Permitted to address the Council, the Ethiopian delegate 
requested that the Council condemn the Italian Government 
and at last enforce all the provisions of Article 16, Will le 
the moment was a tragic one for Ethiopia^ he said it would 
be no less so for the Eeague If it did not make certain 
that no state would he the victim of ambitious and unsoru«« 
pulous aggresslon,^^ A resolution was placed before the 
Council to postpone discussion of the situation until the 
members could have more time to consider the latest Italic 
steps and to recoimend that tha members maintain the sane* 
tlons against Italy# On May 12 the resolution passed with 
the provision that the Council would reconvene on June 15 
to resume deliberations on the situation#^
But the Council did not meet again until June 30,
^3ibld,# pp. SUO-Iil# 
p. 5U0,
102
and by that time the Italian ©uôôesa had been ouch that a 
epocial meeting of the Asoembly had been called. In light 
of this^ the Co^incll washed Its hands of the entire situa* 
tlon and left the matter to the Assembly*
Ihe Assembly had been convened at the request of 
the Argentine Oovernment to «tudy the possibility of lift* 
ing sanctions* Kven before this the sanction front bad 
been broken by the unilateral actions of Equador on April 
1̂.# Haiti and Liberia on June 23# and folaad on June 26# 
all for the rossons that the ^  facto situation rendered 
sanctions useless and that the lifting of sanctions should 
be the decision of sovereign individual states# ^ Public 
pronouncements in various capitals during the latter part 
of June had indicated that most governments considered the 
continuance of sanctions futile# By the time the Assembly 
met# tiers was little remaining support for sanctions# 
although most governments were waiting to see what France 
and Great Britain would do before comitting themselves# 
When the Assembly met# the first item of business 
was not a consideration of the future of sanctions but a 
consideration of a letter that had been dispatched to 
Geneva by the Italian Government# This particular
25L,H,0,J,S,3, IgO# p# 339, 
^^L.-r,0«J.3.3« Igl, pp. 19*21.
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letter was the handiwork of the new Italian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs^ Count Ciano# The letter was an atteaipt 
to win for Italy a warm invitation to return to the League 
as a member in good standings Couched In clever eaplana- 
tiona# the Italian side of the entire Issue was again pre* 
seated to the League# It stated that Italy had always been 
receptive to any attempts that had been made to settle the 
conflict# and that during March it had withheld military 
pressure awaiting the outcome of the committee action» Af* 
ter the Hegus had fled# the letter continued# Italy found 
Ethiopia had been left without law and order# and to com*» 
ply with the wishes of the population she had assumed her 
responsibility# The entire Italian adventure In Ethiopia 
had proved that# like other African populations| that of 
Ethiopia was in need of direction and control# The welcome 
received by the Italian troops proved how grateful the 
population was to see law and order restored# The letter 
informed the League that Italy would be glad to render re-̂  
ports to it concerning the progress Italy was making in its 
**heavy task** of civilizing Ethiopia*
The letter concluded with an Italian declaration 
again offering her support and cooperation to the League 
and its work In settling the grave problems of Europe and 
the world* The Italian Government could not help but recall#
10k
however» the Immediate neeesclty for the removal
••«of such obstacles as have been and are In the way 
of international cooperation which Italy sincerely 
seeksf and to i^leh she la prepared to give a tangible 
contribution for the sake of find maintenance of peace*
The most painful event for the Aasesibly was the 
speech made on its floor by Halle S e l a s s i e , a n  urgent 
plea to the Assembly to take steps to restore the honor of 
Ethiopia and to make sure thct such abandonment to an ag^ 
gressor would never be allowed to happen again* He retold 
the story of the delays that had enabled Italy to attack 
Ethiopia* He said he thought it impossible that fifty two 
nations could be held in check by one aggressor» but bo-» 
cause one nation had been willing to atte%%qpt to retain 
Italy^s friendship by sacrificing Ethiopians independence» 
the aggressor had been able to hold out against the League* 
His great disappointment now was that the League was talk-» 
ing of lifting the sanctions against the aggressor^ rather 
than exercising the leadership necessary for the protection 
of small states# It was not the Covenant that needed re-» 
form» he said» for what good are articles without the will 
to enforce them? "It is International morality that is at 
stake and not the articles of the Covenant»**• I ask again 
that the integrity of Ethiopia be restored» What answer
^^Ibld.. pp. 22-25.
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do I take baok to nay people?”
The Asaembly had no enswar for Halle Salasale«
Only South Africa and Hew Zealand desired to maintain the 
sanctions*
On July the threefold question facing the League 
was defined by Gabriel Turbay^ the delegate from Columbia# 
What would be the fate of the sanctions against Italy^ what 
action would the League take In regard to Italy* s ai^noxa- 
tlon of Ethiopia* and should there be a modification of the 
Covenant? While practically all the speakers deplored and 
regretted the Leaguers failure to halt the Italians* none 
was prepared to attempt to rectify the situation* It was 
then generally considered that the only means to accomplish 
a rectification would be through military action against 
Italy* a move that was never given any consideration* That 
decision already had bean made on September 10* 1935# in 
the agreement made between Ho are and Laval* and the sltua^ 
tlon in July of 193& was even less favorable to irdlitary 
sanctions* Since economic sanctions would b® useless if 
continued* the decision was made to lift them#
The logic of this kind of reasoning was questioned 
by the delegate from South Africa# He asked if the nations 
that imposed the a Emotions made the successful resistance 
of Ethiopia a condition to the carrying out of their obliga­
tions# Arguing that making such a condition was not
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compatible with the Covenant# he aaid that the annexation 
of Ethiopia by Italy had resulted in the very situation the 
League was created to prevent# and the obligation to aid 
the Ethiopia never was greater*^®
Fearing that the Assembly was not going to take 
any initiative on its own# on July 3 the Ethiopian delegate 
introduced two draft resolutions* One obligated the mem­
ber» to recognise no annexation by force# and the other
recommended that the members aiake available a loan to
29Ethiopia under the provisions of Article 16*
At the same meeting# the Assembly authorised its 
General Coimittee to draft proposals that would take into 
account the recommendations that had been made by the vari­
ous speakers in the session# An attempt was made the next 
day to pass these proposals prepared by the General Commit­
tee before Ethiopia had had an opportunity to exasilne them# 
Althou^ Ethiopia was able to prevent this# the General Com­
mittee's draft was voted on before action was taken on the 
Ethiopian delegate*s resolutions*
The proposals passed on the evening of July 1̂ .*̂ ^
ZSlbld,. p. 29.
^9lbld.. p. 33.
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The draft In question recowraended that the members refrain 
from recognlalng a forceful change of territory# extended 
an Invitai on for the members to subMt proposals for lioprov^ 
Ing the Covenant# and recommended that the Co-^ordlnatlon 
Co»imittee make the necessary arrangements for lifting the 
sanctions» Ethiopia protested the substitution of reoom^ 
mendations by the General Committee for the resolutions 
that she had introduced# but hers was the only negative 
vote»
Since the drsft of the General Committee bad ln*« 
eluded the essence of the first Ethiopian draft resolution# 
the Assembly was spared the discomfort of voting against 
a resolution definitely Invoking a policy of non-recognl^ 
tlon» Ethiopia managed to obtain a roll call vote on the 
second of its resolution» (the international loan)# but 
this was defeated» Ethiopia cast the single affirmative 
vote# while twenty three voted against the resolution# and 
twenty five abstained, îîussolini must have been pleased.
The Oo-^ordination Commit tee was reaSiiomblod on July 
6 and recommended that all sanctions against Italy should 
be lifted on July IS» The members had agreed to pay Italy^s 
price for renewed collaboration In the league»
Thus the task that had been begun with the Assembly* » 
recommendation of October 10# 1935# ended nine months later.
lOS
The measures tb%t had been taken against Italy had been In 
line with Article 16# though polltloal and military sane-» 
tlons were eliminated for reasons that the committee never 
tacitly expressed* But the contradictory policy of coer-* 
cion end conciliation had wrecked the effort# and the League 
of Nations was due for an agonizing reappraisal of its 
abilities and goals*
The eve'"ta described in this chapter mark the most 
pitiful phase of the entire dispute* The League of Nations# 
through fear of failure and fear of driving Italy from its 
membership# found itself unable to act vigorously or effec­
tively*
The disclosure of uhe Hoare-Laval Plan did much to 
destroy the will to aid Ethiopia* Great Britain and France# 
by proposing terms so completely out of line with the 
Covenant# shattered the spirit of the sanction states*
This loss of faith# combined with the diplomatic maneuver­
ing of France and Italy to bring delays# resulted in ac­
tions less harmful to Italy*
It was irconoelvable that the members could seri­
ously expect Italy to agree to any settlements other than 
on her own terms after the experiences of 1935* It was 
as if the members early in 1936 acknowledged that Italy 
would be victorious# but to save their own feces they
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continued the pretense of abiding by the Covenant*
The Connell ^lled the conftised situation to the 
Assembly, but It failed to produce any measures that could 
undo the realities of the past months* Ethiopia was aban­
doned to the aggressor, but the effect of this on the mem­
bers was a desire to forget and not to remedy*
OKAPTfâ V 
COUCLUâlOlîS
The ezainlnatlon oî the policies of the League of 
Nations in the Italo-^Ethloplon Conflict produces two funda«* 
mentally different conclusions# One of these concerns the 
technical considerations of such an experiment;# and the 
other concerns the political influences; operating in and 
out of the League that so greatly prejudiced its operations# 
These latter considermtlons proved to be the decisive fac­
tor#
Hoare once admitted to the House of Comoona %̂
I have been terrified with the thought— I speak 
very frankly to the House— that we might lead Abyssinia 0X1 to think that the League could do more than it can 
do# that in the end we should find a terrible moment 
of disillusionment in which it might be that Abyssinia 
would be destroyed altogether as en independent State#
Hoare's fears were justified# but in speaking of the 
League failing a further qualification is necessary# If 
''members" and "League" are considered synonymous the blame 
can be placed on the League of Katlons# but if "League" de­
notes the "Covenant"# the charge is unjust# It was the
19 3^7«Parliamentary Debates# December
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members and not the Covenant who were rei^ponslbl® for 
Ethiopia's false hopeA*
The first charge to be leveled against the members 
proceeds from their failure to abide by Article 8 of the 
Covenantt which called on the members to limit their na­
tional armaments* Had the ideal of disarmament, been real­
ised, the successful maintenance of the peace might have 
been possible* Blame for this breach, significant as it 
wasj cannot be individually assessed, but the lack of a 
disarmament agreement was the first step towards a new 
period of warfare.
The next charge against a member arises from Italy's 
unilateral violation of Article 10, Cnee determined to 
conquer Ethiopia, Italy may have attew^ted to excuse her 
actions by degrading Ethiopia, but the fact remains that 
Italian aggression yas another violation of the Covenant, 
Responsibility on this occasion, however, was a simple mat-* 
ter to determine#
The first occasion within the dispute itself when 
the members deserve criticism was the Council's decision to 
delay the application of Article IX» This action h^d been 
requested by the Ethiopian Government on January 3, 1935, 
after the many attempts at direct negotiations with Italy
112
had failed*^ The meiaber» eeemed ready to take this stop
when they placed the dispute on the Council*s agenda, but
political maneuvering by the Italians won a postponement
of any discussions until the Council*s next session* In
defense of the League of Hatlons It may be said that It was
Ethiopia*» Intention that the provisions of Article 11 were
to be employed solely to facilitate the settlement of the
Wal Wal Incident# Once the two had agreed to pursue fur-»
ther talks. It was no longer incumbent on the Council to
give the matter Its attention* But the fact remains that
a delay was allowed which proved to be an extremely dan-̂
gerous precedent* Firm determination from the outset might
have Influenced later Italian actions*
The next occasion which deserves the same type of
scrutiny was the failure of the Council to heed Ethiopia*®
first request for the application of Article 1$* After the
direct talks, in accord with the January 19 agreement, had
proved futile, Ethiopia on Kerch 17 wanted to place the en-*
3tire dispute before the Council# Ethiopia was not only 
seeking aid in achieving a settlement of the Wal Hal Inei-» 
dent, but, beyond that, she asked that the threat to the
^L.K.O.J>« Feb., 193$, p. 2$2.
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peact In the military build-up in Africa be examined♦ The 
Italians objected on the grounds that Article 15 would be 
inapi. lie able because provisions had been made between the 
two for setting up an arbitration commission. The Italian 
argument is questionable, because Ethiopia had not invoked 
Artidle 15 for the,single purpose for which an arbitration 
commission would be forraed, namely the settlement of Wal 
Wal# Why the Council allowed the Italian objection to 
stand is not clear# It may have been because the Council 
had not yet discerned the difference between a settlement 
of the Wal Wal incident and a settlement of all the issues 
involved in the strained 11^lo^Ethioplan relations* In any 
eventI the Council followed its previous precedent and 
postpomd the examination of the relations between the 
two states*
Had the Council exerted the same efforts to con-* 
ciliate in the early months of 1935 that It did after Sep­
tember k$ when it finally considered the issue, there mi^t 
still have been time to save Ethiopia from attack* As it 
was, the Council's examination osme at a time whan Musso­
lini deemed his preparations adequate to add to his East 
African holdings* As the Fascists realized that the league 
was reluctant to enter into the dispute, a co .»t©mpt for it 
gradually grew to the point th&t there seemed little to 
fear from the members* From September onwards, Mussolini
Ilk
knew he could gain more by war than by complying with pro-* 
posais for a settlement.
After the hostilities had opened and the Italians 
had rejected the Committee of Five*a basis for agreement, 
the Assembly took the initiative in linp lament ing the prln-* 
ciples of the Covenant, The members* decision to apply 
sanctions against Italy was » great victory for the League 
In itself. In the face of former failures. It now intend-» 
ed to deal with one of Its most prominent members* The 
peak of the members* support of the Idea of collective 
security came in October, 1935* Impressed with the obll- 
gâtions they had acknowledged by signing the Covenant, it 
seemed that the members would hot abandon Ethiopia after 
all. This, however, was but a short-lived reassurance.
It will be recalled that France and Great Britain 
had made an effort to bring the two sides together outside 
of the League of Katlous In the three-power tsilks In Paris, 
Despite the fact that Mussolini bed not accepted their 
benevolent offers, the French at least were determined to 
keep relations with Mussolini on a cordial level. The im­
pending threat of sanctions caused the French to seek ex­
piations of this sin against Kuasolini, but, because they 
did not want to see the League of îïâtîons crumble, they had
115
to do aomething# Laval gavo the answer hlmaelfî^
It was in order not to break with Great Britain and 
the League that sanotlona were applied# It was in order 
not to break with Italy pind provoke a war, at that time 
practically certain, that sanctions wore ©pplied with 
moderation#
By adopting euch a policy, France, a member of the 
League of Nations, was not following the law of the Cove* 
nant, but instead was fulfilling her friendship commitments 
to Mussolini# K# Paul*Boncour was once shown the notes 
Laval had taken during the î»^^?nco*Italian talks in Homo in 
January# According to him, Mussolini had been granted 
economic rights in Ethiopia and had been led to believe 
also that France would not seriously object if a military 
expedition were planned and attempted*^ Thus, diplomacy 
outside of the League was a consideration that continually 
influenced actions#
From the time of the Hoare-Laval proposal® until 
sanctions were lifted on July 15, the members continued to 
violate the spirit of the Covenant by placing the emphasis 
upon, conciliation rather than upon sanction»# Buch a policy 
was not called for in the Covenant# By desiring a negotiated
^Lulgt Vlllari, It'^lian Foreign Policy Ü 'der Pueao**. 
linl# (New York; Deven*Ads»lr C o #
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«ettlement, the meintoers were asking rather than forcing 
Italy to comply with her obligations* The paramount con­
cern was the great problem of peace on the continent^ not 
peace In Ethiopia* The members felt they had to continue 
conciliation until It had arrived at Its goal# a peace In 
Ethiopia# but not necessarily a just peace*
The members were not thinking clearly when they 
placed their hopes in a negotiated peace throughout 1936# 
for there were only two conditions under which Italy would 
have agreed to negotiate» first# if she was under such 
pressure to make her feel she had no other course left# or 
secondly^ if her position assured her that a settlement 
would be on her terms# Only the first condition was oom-̂  
patlble with the Covenant; the latter was not# Therefore 
if the members had exerted the necessary pressure definite­
ly to check Italy or to defeat her# conciliation would have 
been acceptable and the Covenant would not have been vio­
lated#, But# as it was# Italy did not have to agree to a 
negotiated peace unfavorable to her because her position
assured her that she could impose the desired settlement
6on her victim*
Before conciliation was tried again after Article 16
*Hlghl®y, pp* 213-15.
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had been applied, any negotiations to be In the spirit of 
the Covenant should have come only after the members had 
convinced Italy that victory was Impossible* Diplomatic 
mneuvering should not have been allo'^ed to weaken the de­
termination to defend Ethiopia# But the premature nej^o- 
tiations so frequent thruu^hout the entire dispute encour^ 
aged Italy to continue her mpi^resslon and retarded the 
Le ague ̂ s application of pressure on h e r # 7 One can only 
conclude that the members should not have attempted any 
sanctions rather than the ineffective ones they did apply* 
On the brighter side are the conclusions drawn from 
the technical consideration of the League*s actions. It 
was beoause of political obstacles and not technical ones 
that the League foiled to check Italy# In view of the his­
tory of the technical delays in the League*a handling of 
the Slno-J&psnase dispute, where the subcommittees and ex­
perts used in that instance succumbed to delay, the speed 
with which this same type of organs operated in the Xtolo- 
Kthloplari oonfllct was remarkable#
The decision declaring that Italy had violated the 
Covenant was not madi^ by the Council but by the members# 
Since this was not a Judgment forced on the members, it
ÎHighley, p# 211̂ #
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being a group or decentralized decision instead, the Impl®-* 
menting of the sanctions vas made easier# In the entire 
record of the debates on the decision that Italy had begun 
an aggressive war, not one state expressed an opinion to 
the contrary* While Albania^ Austria, and Hungary an­
nounced that they would not apply sanctions, the moral 
feet of the verdict made it a rolstively easy matter to set 
up the machinery to co-ordinate the members• efforts* While 
this machinery did not operate perfectly, the system was 
still able to function adequately* In fact, the speed with 
which Proposal 1 was agreed upon proves that the system was 
not at fault In explatïUng why the remaining Proposais came 
forth more slowly* If the machinery did not hold up the 
arms embargo, neither should it bear the responsibility of 
the alter delays caused by political reasons*
The measures that were recommended were only a por­
tion of those Included in Article 16 of the Covenant* Po­
litical and military sanctions were never made a subject 
of consideration* When the conference of states met in 
the Co-ordination Committee, there were no precedents to 
follow, for no attempt had been made to apply Article 16,
The resolutions passed In the Assembly in I'yiX had at least 
considered such an event and the members naturally were 
guided by them* The Résolutions had recognised thav there
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might bo a nooosaity for exercising some choice as to the 
type of sanctions to be used as well as the degree In which 
they were to be applied# Since the League was not a uni-* 
versai organization, the members early decided that only a 
selective list of items should be placed under an embargo, 
and thus a system of graduated sanctions came to be used#
The Co-ordination Committee had not labored lon§ be* 
fore it beoaitie aware of the fact that many countries wore 
not prepared to impose sanctions because they lacked the 
necessary legislation* In some countries this was simply 
a neglect to have enacted the nedessary laws, while in 
others it evolved from a constitutional problem# Hero 
again responsibility lies with the members concerned, for 
the Resolutions of 1921 had pointed up this difficulty#
All members had been urged to make provisions in their 
national law to impose Article 16. It was therefore a 
questionable excuse at best. Certainly, if their own secu­
rity had been placed in closer danger, the laws would have
Û
been forthcoming much more promptly.
The fact that the proposals did not envision a
Gsighley conoluaed that inadequate national legis­
lation was not e serious factor in retarding the applica­
tion of the measures passed* It was for political reasons, 
for ”*#*to a large extent Government*s possessed adequate 
general powers. ♦*’* p# 22$.
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coT^plôte aystera of aanctlona haa boon noted# There waa 
certainly a great discrepancy In the ones passed and the 
onea called for in Article 16# There waa never any thought 
of going to the extreme of severing all trade and financial 
relations between the member# and Italy or her nationals* 
Even those items included in Proposals III and IV were 
exempted if paid for or if en route# Psramcunt practical 
interests have more than once been superior to the dictates 
of international morality I The time lag between the adop­
tion of a proposal end its enforcement also presented an 
added means to circumvent the moat severe effects of these 
latter proposals#
The final evaluation of this phase of the League»s 
activities leaves this Impression# Italian aggression was 
not halted because the members were unrealistic# They were 
not motivated by a desire to defend Ethiopia through strict 
interpretation of the Covenant, but followed the dual poli­
cies of conciliation and coercion# Such an unrealistic ap­
proach to the problem could only have ended In the way that 
it did# There waa not the necessary will to abide by the 
principles of the Covenant# But for that one great short-
coming^ Mussolini could have been stopped#
»
AJ?i'I?îDÎX
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RELEVANT ARTICLES OP THE LEAGUE COVENANT
Article lOf^-The Kembers of the League undertake to 
respect and preserve# as against external aggression# the 
territorial Integrity and existing political independence 
of all Members of the League# In case of such aggression# 
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obll- 
gatlon shall be fulfilled*
Article 11#-*^1* ioiy war or threat of war# whether 
irnmedietely affecting any of the Members of the L©a?^ue or 
not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole 
,League, and the League shall take «my action that may be 
deemed wise end effectuel to safeguard the peace of nations# 
In case any such' emergency should arise, the Secretary-Gen­
eral shall, on the request of any Member of the League, 
forthwith summon a meeting of the Council*
2, It is also declared to be the friendly right of 
each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the 
Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affect­
ing international relations which threatens to disturb in­
ternational peace or the good understanding between nations 
upon which peace depends.
Article 12.— 1* The Members of the League agree that, 
if there should arise between them any dispute likely to 
lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to 
arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the 
Council, and they agree In no case to resort to war until 
three months after the award by the arbitrators or the Ju­
dicial decision, or the report by the Council*
2* In any ease under this Article, the award of the 
arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within 
a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be 
made within six months after the submission of the dispute* 
Article 13.— 1* The Members of the League ngre© 
that^ whenever any dispute shall arise between them which 
they recognise to be suitable tor submission to arbitration 
or judicial settlement, which cannot be satisfactorily 
settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject- 
matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.,*.
k* The Members of the League agree that they will 
carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may 
be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against 
any Member of the League that complies therewith* In the 
event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, 
the Council shall propose what steps should be tsken to
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glvô affect thereto*
Article 15*— 1# If there should arise between Mem­
bers of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture# 
which is not submitted to arbitration or Judicial settle­
ment in accordance with Article 13# the Members of the 
League agree that they will submit the matter to the Coun­
cil* Any party to the dispute may effect such submission 
by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the 
Secretary-General# who will make all necessary arrangements 
for a full investigation and consideration thereof#
2* For this purpose the parties to the dispute will 
communicate to the Secretary-General# as promptly as poss­
ible# statements of their case# with all the relevant facts 
and papers# and the Council may forthwith direct the pub­
lication thereof#
3* The Council shall endeavour to effect a settle­
ment of the dispute# and if such efforts are successful# a 
statement shall be made public giving such facts and expla­
nations regarding the dispute and the terras of settlement 
thereof as the Council may deem appropriate*
1;» If the dispute is not thus settled# the Council# 
either unanimously or by a majority vote, shall mnke and 
publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the 
dispute and the recommandations which are deemed Just and 
proper In regard thereto*
5* Any Member of the League represented on the Coun­
cil may make a public statement of the facts of the dispute 
and of its conclusions regarding the same*
6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed 
to by the members thereof# other than the representatives 
of one or more of the parties to the dispute# the Members 
of the League agree that they will not go to war with any 
party to the dispute which complies with the recommenda­
tions of the report*
7* If the Council fails to reach a report Which is 
unanimously agreed to by the members thereof# other than the 
representatives of one or more of the parties to the dis­
pute# the Members of the League reserve to themselves the 
right to take such action as they shall consider necessary 
for the'maintenance of right &nd justice.
8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed 
by one of them# and is found by the Council to arise out of 
a matter which by International law is solely within the 
domestic Jurisdiction of that party, the Council shell so 
report# and shall make no recommendation as to its settle­
ments
9^ The Council may in eny case under this Article 
refer the dispute to the Assembly# The dispute shall be so 
referred at the request of either party to the dispute#
12k
provided that euoh requeat be made within fourteen days 
after theeubmlasion of the dispute to the Council»
10# In any ease referred to the Assembly, all the 
provisions of this Article and of Article 12, relating to 
the action and powers of the Council, shall apply to the 
action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report 
made by the Assembly, If concurred In by the representa­
tives of those Members of the league represented on the 
Council and of a majority of the other Members of the 
League, exclusive In each case of the representatives of 
the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a 
report by the Council concurred in by alltthe members there­
of other than the representatives of one or more of the 
parties to the dispute#
Article 16#— 1, Should any Meiaber of the League re­
sort to war In disregard of Its covenants under Articles 
12, 13, or 1$, it shall Ipso facto be deemed to have commit­
ted an act of war against all other Members of the League, 
which hereby undertake Immediately to subject it to the 
severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohi­
bition of all Intercourse between their nationals and the 
nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention 
of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse be­
tween the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the 
nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the 
League or not#
2, it shall be the duty of the Council in such case 
to recommend to the several Governments concerned what ef­
fective military, naval, or air force the Members of the 
League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to 
be used to protect the covenants of the League#
3# The Members of,the League agree, further, that 
they will mutually support one another in the financial and 
economic measures which are taken under this Article in or­
der to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from 
the above measures, and that they will mutually support one 
another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of 
their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they 
will take the necessary *steps to afford passage through 
their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the 
League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of 
the League#
1|.# Any Member of the League which has violated any 
covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a 
Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in 
by the representatives of all the other fiombers of the 
League represented thereon*
Article 19#--The Assembly may from time to time 
advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of trea­
ties which have become inapplicable and the consideration
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of International conditions whose continuance might endan­
ger the peace of the world*
Resolutions concerning the Economic Weapon adopted 
by the League Assembly, October l|., 1921#^
1# The resolutions and the proposals for amendments 
to Article 16 which have been adopted by the Assembly shall, 
so long as the amendments have not been put In force in the 
form required by the Covenant, constitute rules for guidance 
which the Assembly recommends, as a provisional measure, to
the Council and to the Members of the League In connection
with the application of Article 16.
2* Subject to the special provisions of Article 17^
the economic measured referred to in Article 16 shall be
applicable only in the specific case referred to In this 
article#
3* The unilateral action of the defaulting State 
cannot create a state of war; it merely entitles the other 
Members of the League to resort to acts of war or to de­
clare themselves in a state of war with the Covenant-breek­
ing State; but it Is in accordance with the spirit of the 
Covenant that the League of Rations should attempt, at 
least at the outset, to avoid war, and to restore peace by 
economic pressure#
ll# It is the duty of each Member of the League to 
decide for Itself whether a breach of the Covenant has been 
committed. The fulfilment of their duties under Article 16 
is required from Members of the League by the express terms 
of the Covenant, and they cannot neglect them without breach 
of their Treaty obligations#
5# All oases of breach of Covenant under Article 16 
shall be referred to the Council as a matter of urgency at 
the request of any Member of the League# Further, if e 
breach of Covenant be committed, or if there arise a dan­
ger of such breach being committed, the Secretary-Ceneral 
shall at once give notice thereof to all the Members of the 
Council# Upon receipt of such a request by a Member of the 
League or of such a notice by the Secretary-General, the 
Council will meet as soon as possible# The Council shall 
summon representatives of the parties to the conflict and 
of all States which are neighbors of the defaulting State, 
or which normally maintain close economic relations with 
it, or whose co-operation would be especially valuable for
L*R#0*J»S#S* jS, pp# 22—2l̂ #
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the application of Article 16*6# If the Council la of opinion that a State has 
been guilty of a breach of Covenant# the minutes of the 
meeting at which that opinion is arrived at shall be Irnme*» 
diately sent to all Members of the League# accompanied by 
a statement of reasons and by an invitation to take action 
accordingly* The fullest publicity shall be given to this 
decision*
7# For the purpose of assisting it to enforce Art­
icle 16# the Council may# if it thinks fit# be assisted by 
a technical Committee* This Committee# which will remain 
in permanent session as soon as the action decided on is 
taken# may include# if desirable# representatives of the 
State specially affected*8* The Council shall recommend the date on which 
the enforcement of economic pressure# under Article 16, is 
to be begun# and shall give notice of that date to all the 
Members of the League*
9* All States must be treated alike as regards the 
application of the measures of economic pressure# with the 
following reservations*
(a) It may be necessary to recommend the execution 
of sped si measures by certain States*
(b) If it is thought desirable to postpone# wholly 
or partially# in the case of certain States# 
the effective application of the economic sanc­
tions Isiid down in Article 16# such postpone­
ment shall not be permitted except in so far as 
it is desirable for the success of the common 
plan of action# or reduces to a minimum the 
losses and embarrassments which may be entailed 
in the case of certain Members of the League by 
the application of the sanctions.
lO.lIt is not possible to decide beforehand, and in 
detail# the various measures of an economic# commercial# 
and financial nature to be taken in each ease where economic 
pressure is to be applied*
When the case arises# the Council shall recommend 
to the Members of the League a plan for joint action*
11# The interruption of diplomatic relations may# 
in the first place# be limited to the withdrawal of the 
heads of Missions*
12* Consular relations may possibly be maintained* 
13* For the purposes of the severance of relations 
between persons belonging to the Covenant-breaking State 
and persons belonging to other States Members of the League# 
the test shall be residence and not nationality*
llu In cases of irolonged application of economic 
pressure# measures of increasing stringency may be taken.
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The cuttlng-off of the food «upplles of the civil population 
of the defaulting State shall be regarded as an extremely 
drastic measure which shall only be applied if the other 
measures available are clearly Inadequate»
15* Correspondence and all other methods of commun* 
Ication shall be subjected to special regulations»
16» Humanitarian relations shall be continued»
17# Efforts should be made to arrive at arrange­
ments which would ensure the co-operation of States non- 
Kambere of the League In the measures to be taken»
18# In special circumstances and in support of eco­
nomic measures to be taken» it may become advisables
(ft) to establish an effective blockade of the sea­
board of the Covenant-breaking States 
(b) to entrust to some Members of the League the 
execution of the blockade operations#
19# The Council shall urge upon all the States Mem­
bers of the League that their Governments should take the 
necessary preparatory measures» abpve all of a legislative 
character# to enable them to enforce at short notice the 
necessary measures of economic pressure#
Resolutions adopted by the Co-ordination Committee# First 
Session# October 11-19# 1935^
(a) Declaration adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on 
October lU# 1935
MUTUAL SUPPORT
With ft view to facilitating for the Governments of 
the Members of the League of Rations the execution of their 
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant# it is recog­
nised that any proposals for action under Article 16 are 
made on the basis of the following provisions of that arti- 
clet
'The Members of the League agree# further# that 
;they will mutually support one another in the fin­
ancial and econoBiio measures which are taken under 
this article# in order to minimise the loss and 
inconvenience resulting from the above measures#
^L.W.O.J.S.3. Dp, 11-27.
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end that they will mutually support one another in 
resisting any special measures aimed at one of their 
number by the Covenant-breaking State#^
(b) Resolution adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on 
October 16^ 1935
EXECUTIOII OF OBLIGATION'S WHICH PLOW FROM ARTICLE! 16 OP THE
COVENANT
The Committee of Co-ordination,
Considering that it is important to ensure rapid 
and effective application of the measures which have been 
and may subsequently be proposed by the committeej
Considering that it rests with each country to ap­
ply these measures in accordance with its public law and, 
in particular, the powers of its Government in regard to 
execution of treaties*
Calls attention to the fact that the Members of the 
League, being bound by the obligations which flow from Art­
icle 16 of the Covenant, are under a duty to take the nec­
essary steps to ens,ble them to carry out these obligations 
with all requisite rapidity#
(c) Proposal I, adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on 
October 11, 1935
EXPORT OF ARMS, AHMCNITIOH, AHD IKPLEîlEMS OF WAR
With a view to facllitstlng for the Governments of 
the Members of the League of Rations the execution of their 
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant, the following 
measures should be taken forthwith*
1. The Governments of the Members of the League of 
Rations which are enforcing at the moment measures to pro­
hibit or restrict the exportation, re-exportation, or tran­
sit of arms, munitions, and implements of war to Ethiopia 
will annul these measures immediately*
2* The Governments of the Members of the League of 
Rations will prohibit iimnediately the exportation, re-ex­
portation, or transit to Italy or Italian possessions of 
arms, munitions, and implements of war enumerated in the 
attached list#
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3# Tbô Oovernmonts of tho M^mbors of fch© League of 
Hâtions will take such steps aa may be neoessary to secure 
that arms# munitions# and Implements of war enumerated in 
the attached list# exported to countries other then Italy# 
will not be re-exported directly or indirectly to Italy or 
to Italian possessions*
k* The measures provided for in paragraph 2 and 3 
are to apply to contracts in process of execution.
Each Government la requested to inform the oonmlt- 
tee through the Secretary-General of the League within the 
shortest possible time of the measures which It has taken 
in conformity with the above provisions#
ARTICLES COHSIDSHEi) AS ARMS# Âîl^OTïITIOK# AHD 
I W L T C H T S  OF WAR
Category I#
1* Rifles and carbines and their barrels#2# Maohine«*guns# automatic rifles# and machine- 
pistols of all calibres and their barrels#
3* Guns# howitzers# and mortars of ell calibres# 
their mountings# barrels# and recoil mechanlsms#
I4# Ammunition for the arms enumerated under 1 and 2 above; filled and unfilled projectiles for the arms enu^ 
merated under 3 above# and prepared propellant charges for 
these arms#
$# Grenades# bombs# torpedoes# and mines# filled or 
unfilled# and apparatus for their use or discharge#6# Tanks# armoured vehicles# and armoured trains# 
Armor-plate of all kinds*
Category II#
Vessels of war of all kinds# Including aircrr^ft- 
carriers and submarines#
Category III#
1# Aircraft# assembled or dismantled# both heavier 
and lighter than air# and their propellers or elr-sorews# 
fuselages# aerial-gun mounts and frames# hulls, tall units# 
and under-carriage units#
2# Alrcrsft-engines*
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Category IV*
He7olvera and automatic poatols of a weight In ex** 
ceas of X pound 6 ounces(63O grammes) and ammunition there* 
for*
Category V#
1* Flame-*throwers and ell other projectors used for 
chenLical or Incendiary warfare*
2* Mustard gas* Lewistlte* ethyldlohloraralne# 
methyldichlorarslne* and all other products destined for 
chemical or Incendiary warfare*
3t Powder for war purposes* and explosives*
(e) Proposal II* adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on 
October 1L» 1935
FIÎ«̂AÎsiClAL i'l£ASUa£S
With a view to facilitating for the Governments of 
the Members of the League of Katlons the execution of their 
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant* the following 
measures should be taken forthwith:
The Governments of the Members of the League of 
Katlons will forthwith take ell measures necessary to ren­
der impossible the following opérationst
1* All loans to or for the Italian Government and 
all subscriptions to loans Issued in Italy or elsewhere by 
or for the Italian Government;
2* All banking or other credits to or for the Ital­
ian Government and any further execution by advance* over­
draft* or otherwise of existing contracts to lend directly 
or indirectly to the Italian Government;
3# All loans to or for any public authority* person* 
or corporation in Italian territory and all subscriptions 
to such loans issued In Italy or elsewhere;
I4.* All banking or other credits to or for any pub­
lic authority* person* or corporation in Italian territory 
and any further execution by advance* overdraft* or other­
wise of existing contracts to lend directly or indirectly 
to such authority* person* or corporation;5. All Issues of shares o;r other capital flottations 
for any public authority* person* or corporation in Italian 
territory and all subscriptions to such issues of shares or
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capital flotations In Italy or elsewhere;6# The Governments will take all measures necessary 
to render impossible the transactions mentioned In para<« 
graphs 1-*S whether effected directly or through intermedia# 
arias of whatsoever nationality#
The Governments are Invited to put in operation at 
once such of the measures recommended as can be enforced 
without fresh legislation# and to take all practicable steps 
to secure that the measures recommended are completely put 
into operation by October 31» 1935* Any Governments which 
find it impossible to secure the requisite legislation by 
that date are requested to inform the Committee# through 
the S©cretary«#G©nerali of the date by which they expect to 
be able to do so#
Each Government is requested to inform the Commit­
tee» through the Secretary-General of the League» within 
the shortest possible time of the measures which it has 
taken in conformity with the above provisions*
(f) Proposal III» adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on 
October 19» 1935
PROHIBITION OF IMPORTATION OF ITALIAN GOODS
With a view to facilitating for the Governments of 
the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their 
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant» the following 
measures should be taken;
1# The Governments of the Members of the League of 
Nations will prohibit the Importation into their territories 
of all goods (other than gold or silver bullion and coin) 
consigned from or grown» produced» or manufactured in Italy 
or Italian possessions, from whatever place arriving;
2* Goods grown or produced in Italy or Italian pos­
sessions which have been subjected to some process in ani» 
other country» and goods manufactured partly in Italy or 
Italian possessions and partly In another country will be 
considered as falling within the scope of the prohibition 
unless 25 per cent# or more of the value of the goods at 
the time when they left the place from which they were last 
consigned la attributable to processes undergone since the 
goods lest left Italy or Italian possessions;
3* Goods, the subject of existing contracts, will 
not be excepted from the prohibition;
I4.# Goods en route at the time of Imposition of the 
prohibition will be excepted from its operf»tion# In giving
1 3 2
effect to this provision Governments may# for convenience 
of administration# fix an appropriate date^ having regard 
to the normal time necessary for transport from Italy# after 
which goods will become subject to the prohibition;
$é Personal belongings of travelers from Italy or 
Italian possessions may also be excepted from its operas
tlOD#
Having regard to the importance of collective and, 
so far as possible, airaultanéous action In regard to the 
measures recommended, each Government is requested to in-* 
form the Co-ordination Committee# through the Secretary- 
General# as soon as possible# and not later than October 28# 
of the date on which it could be ready to bring these meas­
ures into operation# The Co-ordination CoBunittee will meet 
on October 31 for the purpose of fixing# in the light of 
the replies received# the date of the coming into force of 
the said measures.
(g) Proposal IV# adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on 
October 19# 193$
EMBARGO OSi CERTAIN EXPORTS TO ITALY
With a view to facilitating for the Governments of 
the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their 
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant, the follow­
ing measures should be takeni
1, The Governments of the Members of the League of 
Nations will extend the application of paragraph 2 of Pro­
posal No. 1 of the Co-ordination Coramlttea to the follow­
ing articles as regards their exportation and re-exporta­
tion to Italy and Italian possessions# which will accord­
ingly be prohibited;
(a) Horses# mules# donkeys, camels# and all other 
transport animals;
(b) Rubber;(e) Bauxite, aluxftlnlum and alumina (aluminium oxide), 
iron ore# ana scrap iron;
Chromium, manganese# nickel# titanium# 
tungsten# vsnadlum# their ores and ferro-alloys 
(and also ferro-molybdenum, ferro-eilloon, ferro- 
silico-mancranese# and ferro-sillco-mangsnese 
aluminium);
Tin and tineore* 
list (c) above includes all crude forms of the min­
erals and metals mentioned and their ores# scrap, and alloys;
133
2# The Governments of the Meiobere of the League of 
Katlons will take such steps as may be necessary to secure 
that the articles mentioned in paragraph 1 above exported 
to countries other than Italy or Italian possessions will 
not be re-exported directly or indirectly to Italy or to 
Italian possessions;
3* The measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 
2 above are to apply to contracts in course of execution;
Goods en route at the time of imposition of the 
prohibition will be excepted from its operation# In giving 
effect to this provision Governments may, for convenience 
of administration, fix an appropriate date, having regard 
to the normal time necessary for transport to Italy or 
Italian possessions, after which goods will become subject 
to the prohibition#
Having regard to the importance of collective and, 
so far as possible, simultaneous action in regard to the 
measures recommended, each Government is requested to in­
form the Co-ordination Committee, through the Secretary- 
General, as soon as possible, and not later than October 28, 
of the date on which it could be ready to bring these meas­
ures into operation. The Committee of Co-ordination' will 
meet on October 31 for the purpose of fixing, in the light 
of the replies received, the date of the coming into force 
of the said measures#
The attention of the Co-ordination Conmilttee has 
been drawn to the possible extension of the above proposal 
to a certain number of other articles# It entrusts the 
Committee of Eighteen with the tssk of making any suitable 
proposals to Governments on this subject#
(h) Proposal V, adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on 
October 19, 1935
ORGANISATIOK OF W T U k t  SHPPGHT
The Co-ordination Committee draws the special at­
tention of all Governments to their obligations under para­
graph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant, according to which 
the Meïiibers of the League undertake mutually to support one 
another in the application of the economic and financial 
measures taken under this article#
I# With a view to carrying these obligations into 
effect the Governments of the Members of the League of 
Nations wills
(a) Adopt immediately measures to ensure that no 
action taken as a result of Article 16 will
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deprive any country applying aanotlons of auch 
advantages aa the commercial agreements con« 
eluded by the participating States with Italy 
afforded it through the operation of the most* 
favoured*natlon clause;
(b) Take appropriate steps with & view to replac* 
ing# within the limits of the requirements of 
their respective countries, imports from Italy 
by the iir^ort of similar products from the par-' 
tlclpating States;
(c) Be willing^ after the application of economic 
sanctions, to enter Into negotiations with any 
participating country which has sustained a 
loss, with a view to increasing the sale of 
goods so as to offset any loss of Italian mar^ 
kets which the application of sanctions may 
have Involved;
(d) In cases in which they have suffered no loss
in respect of any given commodity, abstain from 
demanding the application of eny uaost-favoured* 
nation clause in the case of fny privileges 
granted under paragraphs (b) and (e) in respect 
of that commodity*
II* With the above objects, the Governments will, 
if necessary, with the assistance of the Committee of Eight­
een, study, in particular, the possibility of adopting with­
in the limits of their existing obligations, and taking in* 
to consideration the annexed opinion of the legal sub*com­
mittee of the Co-ordination Committee, the following meas­
ures;
(1) The increase by all appropriate measures of 
their imports in favour of such countries as 
may have suffered loss of Italian markets on 
account of the application of sanctions;
(2) In order to facilitate this increase, the tak­
ing into consideration of the obligations of 
mutual support and of the advantages which the 
trade of certain States Members of the League 
of Nations, not participating in the sanctions, 
would obtain from the application of these sanc­
tions, in order to reduce by every appropriate 
means and to an equitable degree imports coming 
from these countries;
(3) The promotion, by all means in their power, of 
business relations between firms interested in 
the sale of goods in Italian markets which have 
been lost owing to the application of sanctions 
and firms normallv importing such goods;
{l̂ y Assistance generally In the organisation of the
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International marketing of good» with a view 
to offsetting any loss of Italian markets which 
the application of sanctions may beve involved# 
% e y  will also examine, under the same 
conditions, the possibility of financial or 
other measures to supplement the commercial 
measures In so far as these latter may not 
sure sufficient International mutual support# 
III* The Co^'ordinatlon Committee requests the Gom^ 
mlttee of Eighteen to afford^ if necessary, to the Govern-* 
ment» concerned the assistance contemplated at the begin­
ning of Part II of the present proposal#
APPLICATION OF THE KOmT-FàVOI?K2SD-NâTION CLAUSE
1# The Legal Suo-Gonmlttee has been asked to ad­
vise whether a country participating in the sanctions which 
at presehtf under the most-favoured-nation clause, benefits 
by concessions made to Italy under conaneroial treaties with 
other States which are participating in the sanctions can 
continue to do so when the sanctions have resulted in sus­
pension of the concessions made to Italy#
The Sub-Committee is of the following opinloni 
The most-favoured-nation clause cannot give a right 
to continued enjoyment of the advantages in question, since 
application of most-favoured-nation treatment depends upon 
the existence of a particular state of things# It is, 
nevertheless. In conformity with the spirit of Article 26, 
paragraph 3, of the Covenant that the advantages should 
continue to be accorded independently of the meat-favoured-* 
nation clause, for one could hardly conceive that the States 
participating in the sanction», which are under an obliga­
tion to support one another mi tually, should proceed to 
render their economic relations with one another more dif­
ficult than before#
Tho Sub-Committee considers that this view might 
advantageously be expressed in the proposal dealing with 
economic sanctions by the insertion therein of a provision 
to the following effect%
•States participating in the sanctions which, 
in virtue of most-favoured-nstion treatment, have 
up to the present been obtaining from other parti­
cipating State» advantages or benefits accorded by 
the latter to Italy, of which Italy will bo tempo­
rarily deprived through the application of sanctions, 
will continue to enjoy such advantages and conces­
sions on the new ground of the mutual support which
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tho Member8 of the League of Katlons are bound to 
afford one another under Article 16, paragraph 3» 
of the Covenant*^
2* The Legal 8ub-Committee has been asked to ad­
vise whether it Is legally maintainable that countries en­
titled to the benefit of the most-favoured-nation clause 
would nevertheless not be Justified in claiming for them­
selves the advantages of preferential treatment accorded, 
temporarily and for the duration of the sanctions only, by 
one of the participating States to the goods of another 
participating State whoso exports had been specially re­
stricted as the result of the sanctions*
The Sub-Coïtffîiltte© is of tho following opinion:
The loost-fnvoired-nation clause would not justify 
the extension of the advantages in question to third States* 
The reasons are, first, that such advantages would have an 
exceptional as well as a temporary character and would be 
the consequence of a special obligation existing between 
the States concerned in virtue of Article 16, paragraph 3^ 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and, secondly, 
that the most-favoured-natlon clause is a provision pecu­
liar to commercial treaties, which are the treaties in 
which it is found, and, accordingly, is one which must be 
interpreted as not contemplating economic relations of so 
exceptional a nature as those which are here under consid­
eration*
(i) Text approved by the Co-ordination Committee on Octo­
ber 19» 1935
COMIOTICATION TO STATES K0K-MEMB23S OF THE 
LÎ3AGUE OF NATIONS
The Chairman of the Committee of Co-ordination of 
measures to bo taken under Article 16 of the Covenant h^s 
the honour to transmit herewith to States non-members of 
the League, in accordance with the decision of the Co-ordi­
nation Committee formed as the result of the recormiendation 
adopted by the Assembly on October 10, the principal recent 
documents in the Italo-Ethîonîan dispute, including the min­
utes of the Council of October 7» the minutes of the Assem­
bly of October 9 to 11, and the recommendations of the Co­
ordination Committee*
He is instructed to add that the Governments repre­
sented on the Co-ordination Committee would welcome any com­
munication which any non-member State may deem it proper to
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make or notification of any action which it may bo taking 
in tha olrcumatancos»
Resolutions adopted by the Co-ordinafclon Committee, Second 
Session, October 31-Hoveiaiber 2, 1935^
Resolution adopted by the Co-»ordination Corinnltbee on 
November 2, 193i>
OUTSTANDING CLAIMS
The Members of the League of Nations participating 
in the measures taken In regard to Italy under Article 16 
of the Covenant,
Having regard. In particular# to Proposal III, un­
der which they have agreed to prohibit as from November 18 
all imports consigned from Italy or her possessions;
I* Consider that the debts now payable by Italy to 
thorn# under clearing agreements or any other arrangements, 
the payment of which becomes impossible by reason of the 
aforesaid prohibition, will remain valid at their present 
value notwithstanding any offers of payment in kind that 
may be made by Italy or any action that might be taken by 
her against the creditor States;
II# Recognize:
(a) That, on the discontinuance of the measures 
taken in regard to Italy under Article 16 of 
the Covenant, they should support one another 
In order to ensure that Italy discharges her 
obligations to the creditor States as she should 
have done if she had not incurred the applica­
tion of Article 16 of the Covenant;
(b) Furthermore, th'̂ t, if in the meantime particu­
larly serious losses are sustained by certain 
States owing to the suspension by Itmly of the 
payment of the aforesaid debts, the mutual sup­
port provided for by paragraph 3 of Article 16 
will be specially given in order to make good 
such losses by all appropriate measures#
The Committee on Mutual bupport will draw up a list
^L.y.O.J.S.S. Ili6, pp. 8-13.
X3fl
of the debts referrjftd to In paragraph I above, and will 
examine the meaaurea contemplated in paragraph 11(b) above*
Resolutions adopted by the Gomalttee of Eighteen, October 3X-
November 6, 1935
(a) Proposal 11(a), adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on 
November 6, 1935
GLKAHINC AGREEMENTS
The Committee of Eighteen,
Entrusted by the Co-ordination Committee with the 
task of following the execution of the proposals submitted 
to Governments and empowered to make such new propos61a as 
It may think desirable, proposes that the following meas­
ures should be taken^
In order to render effective the application of 
Proposal and Proposal III, approved by the Committee
of Co-*ordination, Governments represented on the Co-ordi­
nation Committee will--
îé (a) Prohibit, as from November 18, the accept­
ance of any new deposit of lire into the Italian 
clearing account in payment for exports to Italy, 
and, in consequence,
(b) Suspend to the extent necessary the opera-* 
tion of any clearing or payments agreement that 
they may have with ItRly by or befdre November 18;
II# Take, if need be, the necessary steps to ensure
that the purchase price of Italian products al­
ready imported, or to be imported, in respect 
of which payment has not yet been made, shall 
be lodged in a national account, the resources 
of which will, if necessary, be employed for the 
settlement of claims arising from their exports* 
Each Government is requested to Inform the Go-ordl- 
natlcn Committee through the Secretary-General of the League, 
within the shortest possible time, of the measures which it
has taken in cônformity with the above provisions.
^L.y.O.J.S.S. Ih6, pp, Ji.6-50,
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(b) Proposal Ilî(a)^ adopted by the Committee of Eighteen 
on Kovember 6^ 193?
BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, &c.
The CoBmilttee of Eighteen,
Having been Instructed by the Co-ordination Commit­
tee to follow the execution of the proposals submitted to 
Governments, and being empowered to make such further pro­
posals as it may think expedient*
Proposes thrt, as an exception to Proposal III, the 
prohibition to import goods consigned from Italy or Italian 
possessions should not be extended to books, newspapers, and 
periodicals, maps and cartographical productions, or print­
ed or engraved music*
(c) Proposal adopted by the Committee of Eighteen
on November 6, 1935
EMBARGO ON CERTAIN EXPORTS TO XTiVLY
In the execution of the mission entrusted to it 
under the last paragraph of Proposal IV, the Committee of 
Eighteen submits to Governments the following proposal*
It is expedient that) the measures of embargo pro­
vided for In Proposal IV should be extended to the follow­
ing articles as soon as the conditions necessary to render 
this extension effective have been realized:
Petroleum and its derivatives, by-products, and 
residues ;
plg-ironjlron and steel (including alloy steels), 
cast, forged, rolled, drawn, stamped, or pressed;
Coal (including anthracite and lignite), coke and 
their agglomerates, as well as fuels derived 
therefrom*
If the replies received by the Committee to the 
present proposal and the information at its disposal war­
rant it, the Committee of Eighteen will propose to Govern­
ments A date for bringing into force the mesauraa mentioned 
above #
(d) Proposal IV(b), edorted by the Committee of Eighteen 
on November 6, 1935
iho
IIÎDIHF.CT S W P L Y
The Coimnittee of Eighteen^
Entrusted by the Co-ordination Coiaralttee with the 
task of following the execution of the proposals subralt- 
ted to Governments and empowered to make such new proposal# 
as It may think desirable, is of opinion that the follow­
ing measures should be taken:
In order to render effective the provisions of 
point 2 of Proposal iVj Governments represented 
on the Co-ordination Committee will tak©^ as re­
gards the export of prohibited products, such 
measures as are necessary to verify, by all 
means in their power, the destination of such 
products#
Those Governments which do not immediately restrict 
their exports of these articles will keep under 
constant review the volume and direction of such 
export# In the ev^nt of an abnormal Increase 
in this export, they will immediately take such 
steps as may be necessary to prevent supplies 
reaching Italy or Italian possessions by Indi­
rect routes.
Each Government is requested to Inform the Co-ordi­
nation Committee, through the Secretary-General of the 
League, within the shortest possible time, of the measure# 
which it has taken in conforznity with the above provisions.
(e) Resolution adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on 
November 6, 1935
CONTRACTS ÎH COURSE OF EXECUTION
The Committee of Eighteen instructs a Sub-Commit­
tee consisting of representatives of the United Kingdom, 
France, Kexlco, loiand, Roimania, and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics to make proposals to the interested 
Government# on its behalf in regard to those oontraota-- 
othor than those In respect of which p&iment had been made 
in full by October 19, 1933-*-which might be executed by way 
of exception to paragraph No. 3 of Proposai III#
In making its proposals, the Sub-Committee will be 
guided by the following principlesi
(a^ Exception to be made only in the case of con­
tract# concluded by a State or institution
lUi
belonging to a State or entirely subject to Its 
administrative control, or for their account, 
prior to October 19, 1935# which relate to goods 
of essential Importance to the importing Statej
(b) Not less than 20 per cent, of the total sums 
due under the contract to have been paid by 
October 19# 1935;
(o) Contracts stipulating for payment in goods# the 
export of which to Italy is prohibited under 
Proposal IV# not to have the benefit of the ex-* 
ceptlon in question;
(d) Governments to furnish the Sub-Commlttee# not 
later thf*n November 1C, with full details of 
each contract (nature of goods# total sums due# 
amount psld prior to October 19# 1935# and 
amount outstanding on November 10# 1935)*
The Sub-Committee will draw up# not later than 
November 12# the final list of contracts in the case of ■ 
which an exception appears to it to be justified# and will 
communicate the list forthwith for information to the Gov­
ernments represented on the Co-ordination Committee*
Outline of an Agreed Settlement of the Itelo-Ethlopian Con­
flict# December 10, 1935^
I* Exchange of Territories
The Governments of the United Kingdom and France 
agree to recommend to His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia 
the acceptance of the following exchanges of territory be­
tween Ethiopia and Italy,
(a) Tigres Cession to Italy of eastern Tigre# ap­
proximately limited on the south by the River Gheva and on 
the west by a line running from north to south# passing be­
tween Aksum (on the Ethiopien side) and Adowa (on the 
Italian aide),
(b) Rectification of frontiers between the Danakll 
country and Eritrea, leaving to the south of the boundary 
line Auasa and the extent of Eritrea territory necessary 
to give Ethiopia an outlet to the sea to be defined below,
(c) Rectification of frontiers between the Ogaden 
and Italien Somaliland, Starting from the tri-junction
>0, J.# Jan. 1936, pp. l̂ O-Ul*
lî^
point between the frontiers of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Italian 
Somaliland, the new Itslo**Ethioplan front 1er "would follow 
a general north-easterly direction, cutting the Wobl Shoball 
at Iddldolo, leaving Gorahal to the east, WarandRb to the 
west, and meeting the frontier of British Somaliland whore 
it intersects the U5th meridian.
The rights of the tribes of British Somaliland to 
the use of grazing areas and wells situated in the terri­
tories granted to Italy by this delimitation should be guaranteed,
(d) Ethiopia will receive an outlet to the sea with 
full sovereign rights# It seems that this outlet should be 
formed preferably by the cession, to which Italy would agree, 
of the port of Assab and of a strip of territory giving ac­
cess to this port along the frontier of French Somaliland,
The United Kingdom and French Governments will en­
deavour to obtain from the Ethiopian Government guarantees 
for the fulfilment of the obligations which devolve upon 
them regarding slavery and arms traffic in the territories 
acquired by them#
lit Zone of Economic Expansion and Settlement
The United Kingdom and French Governments will use 
their'influence at Addis Ababa and at Geneva to the end 
that the formation in Southern Ethiopia of a zone of econom­
ic expansion and settlement reserved to Italy shoula be 
accepted by His Majesty the Emperor and approved by tho 
League of Nations,
The limits of this zone would be* on the east, the 
rectified frontier between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland; 
on the north, the 8th parallel; on the west, the 35th meri­
dian; on the south, the frontier between Ethiopia and 
Kenya, Within this zone, which would form an integral part 
of Ethiopia, Italy would enjoy exclusive economic rights 
which might be aoministerod by a privileged company or by 
any other like organization, to which would be recognized- 
subject to the acquired rights of natives and forelgners-- 
the right of ownership of unoccupied territories, the mono­
poly of the exploitation of mines, forests, 6cc, This or­
ganization would be obliged to contribute to the economic 
equipment of the country and to devote a portion of its 
revenues to expenditure of a social character for the bene­
fit of the native population.
The control of the Ethiopian administration in the 
zone would be exercised, under the sovereignty of the Emper­
or, by the services of the scheme of assistance drawn up
ll|3
by the League of îîations# Italy woull take à preponderate^ 
Ing, but not an exclualve, share in these services^ which 
would be under the direct control of one of the principal 
advisers attached to the Central Covernzcont. The princi­
pal adviser in quostlon, who night be of Italian nation­
ality# would be the aasist3.ut, for the affairs in question, 
of the Chief Adviser delegated by the League of Nations to 
assist the Emperor. The Chief Adviser would not be a sub­
ject of one of the Powers borcit-ring on Ethiopia,
The services of the scheme of assistance, in/the 
capital as well as In the resem^ed zone, would regard it as 
one of their essential duties to ensure the safety of 
Italian subjects and the free development of their enters 
prises.
The Government of the United Kingdom and tho French 
Government will willingly endeavour to ensure that this or­
ganization, the details of y/hich mist be elaborated by the 
League of Nations, fully safeguards the interests of Italy 
in this region.
The foregoing text is the text which was coirimuni- 
Gated to the Italian Government. Two modifications wore 
Introduced Into the text communicated to the Ethiopian 
Gov®i*nment i
1, The first paragraph of Section II was drafted 
as follows:
’The United Kin̂ '̂ dora and French Governments 
recommend Hie Kajeety the Emperor to ocoept, and 
will U3© their influonca to secure the approvrJ of 
the League of Nations of, the formation in L:*outhern 
Ethiopia of a zone of économie expansion and set­
tlement reserved to Italy.’
2» A few words were aided to the end of the first 
sentence of the fourth paragraph of the same Section II. 
These words are as follows:
’The control of the Ethiopian administration in 
the zone would be exercised, under the sovereignty 
of the Emperor, by tho services of the scheme of 
assistance drawn up by the League of Nations and 
already accepted by the Emperor as extending over 
the whole area of Ethiopian administration,’
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